In a simple metaphor, Brazil’s role in the leadership of the G20 can be summarized as “drying ice”. This is not the result of mistakes made by Brazilian diplomacy under the current government. Any country with the same status that Brazil enjoys in the international system would suffer the same limitations in an era in which great powers, who possess economic and military power, prioritise their interests. The country is considered a middle power, with a certain regional influence, but no presence on a global scale.

We’re not just in the world of America First. China First, Russia First, EU First: each looking after itself instead of trying to establish a minimum of coordination between them on issues such as global warming, trade and international security. It’s not easy for middle powers to be able to talk big with the rest of the world.

Even so, regional powers can influence specific elements of relations between countries and, therefore, of the global order. Compared to India’s presidency of the G20 the previous year, Brazil has made notable progress on social issues, having put the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty on the agenda, which is in line with Agenda 2030 of the Sustainable Development Goals 1 (poverty eradication) and 2 (zero hunger and sustainable agriculture).

A fund to combat disinformation

Under Brazilian leadership, the debate on combating climate change has also gained even more priority, with an emphasis on optimizing funds for this global challenge, including the idea to be presented in Rio de Janeiro of forming a fund to combat the spread of disinformation in the sector.

These points contrast with the lack of progress in the debates on the much-needed global governance reforms. Success requires dialogue with the Russians, the Americans, Chinese and Europeans.

With Trump back in the White House, Moscow at war with Ukraine and Beijing grappling with internal economic problems, only the EU – at least for as long as it isn’t captured by ultra-right-wing forces – tends to show the slightest willingness to join a global action agenda.

Nationalisms overshadow global alliance

That’s unless the interests of the major powers change even more as a result of Trump 2.0’s actions. For example, in an era of growing nationalism, what’s the point of supporting a global alliance to fight hunger and poverty if countries seek unilateral or bilateral solutions, partnering with regional allies or those with whom they have greater ideological affinity? China, whose economic dimension could fill the void left by the United States in multilateralism, is not interested in playing the role of articulating the provision of global public goods either.

The EU and other European political actors, notably the UK, will have to devote more resources to their own security. This is because Trump has already shown himself to be in favor of an understanding with Russia in the war against Ukraine and is seeking to reduce American commitments within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), thus putting pressure on Europeans to put more money into military spending.

Superficial legacy on climate

On the climate-environment issue, whatever Brazil’s legacy at the G20, the risk of superficiality is even greater. Again, this is because of the changes in sight in the configuration of the power game between the great powers and the interests of other members of the bloc. For example, it is certain that Trump will once again withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement, which should nullify any effect of the energy transition partnership that Lula will sign with Joe Biden during the G20 meeting.

Furthermore, India – which has flirted with great power status due to its nuclear weapons and robust economic growth in recent years – is essentially dependent on fossil fuels and shows no sign of letting go of this. The same reasoning applies to other G20 regional powers such as Indonesia and Mexico.

So, barring a miracle, the Brazilian presidency of the G20 – touted as an instrument to demonstrate Brazil’s ability to play an active role in reshaping the global order in the 21st century – is likely to end with limited results, as other members of the bloc turn a deaf ear on President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s desire to lead the world in development.

Lula doesn’t even have the support of Brazil’s main historical partner in the G20, Argentina. Under right-wing leader Javier Milei, Buenos Aires rejects everything Brazil stands for. If we can’t even lead our neighborhood, it’s chimerical to claim an active role in shaping the global order beyond specific issues.

Vinícius Rodrigues Vieira is an associate professor of Economy and International Relations at Fundação Armando Alvares Penteado (FAAP)

This article was originally published in The Conversation. Read the original article here: https://theconversation.com/brazilian-presidency-of-the-g20-is-likely-to-end-with-limited-results-243837

Macron welcomed Lula at the Elysée in an unusual sign of support for Bolsonaro’s main rival for the October 2022 elections. Lula is ahead in every poll, although neither Bolsonaro nor Lula has yet launched their candidacy.

The meeting with Macron showed Lula seeking to capitalize on Bolsonaro’s diplomatic isolation resulting from his environmental policies which have resulted in deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon rising to a 15-year high.

“It seems like a provocation,” Bolsonaro said of the meeting in a radio interview. “(Macron) is more interested in having a passive and corrupt person like Lula, an ally of his, than someone like me (leading Brazil) in the future,” he added.

Lula was convicted in 2018 of taking bribes from engineering companies in exchange for public contracts and spent a year and a half behind bars before Brazil’s supreme court overturned his convictions this year, opening the door to a presidential race.

Bolsonaro’s rift with Macron dates back to 2019 when the French president denounced the growing number of fires in the Amazon and Bolsonaro replied that those comments were disrespectful of Brazilian sovereignty. Bolsonaro also made improper comments regarding Macron’s wife at the time.

This conflict is said to be among the leading causes why a trade deal between the European Union and Mercosur, agreed upon in 2019 after two decades of talks, has not yet been ratified.

The controversial Bolsonaro is said to be among the candidates for the prestigious Time magazine’s Personality of the Year award. “I hope to win,” Bolsonaro said when told about the possibility.

Bolsonaro was said Thursday to be way ahead in that race thanks to the support from his followers to be declared “the most influential” person in the world.

The Brazilian leader was ahead with 76% of the votes, followed by former US President Donald Trump. Vying for third place were health care professionals linked to the fight against COVID-19.

“Times magazine (sic) has been doing a survey that has been going on for decades. The personality of the year. There are 100 people. I was among the 100 people in 2019 and 2020 and now in 2021 we are leading,” Bolsonaro said during his weekly broadcast on social media, as he called on supporters to keep voting for him.

Brazilian media have reported Bolsonaro followers had agreed on Telegram to massively support the president.

“That’s fired up! I hope to win if I deserve it. I thank whoever voted for me,” he added.

Every year the magazine highlights the life and work of a man, woman, couple, group, idea, place or machine that has most influenced world events in the last 12 months “for better or for worse.” Nevertheless, Time reserves the right to make the final choice.

In addition to his Amazonia approach, Bolsonaro is known for considering COVID-19 a disease which can be treated with drugs not recommended by the World Health Organization much better than with vaccines.

Mercopress

Though disagreement between the two blocs over beef and ethanol production represent the primary obstacles to an agreement, the general optimism of Brazilian policy makers reflects the ongoing progress of Mercosur’s regional and international agenda, with transnational economic integration as the primary aim.

Brazil has been a leader in Mercosur’s policy since the inception of the organization in 1991. The Asuncion Treaty, and its legacy of the Ouro Preto Protocol, reveal the goals of regional and international trade facilitation.

Mercosur is measured to be the fifth largest economy in the world, with Brazil contributing 70% of Mercosur’s GDP, valued at approximately US$ 3 trillion. Brazil’s National Development Bank (BNDES) plays an active role in the coordination of economic policy, and Mercosur’s aspirations are restricted not only to Europe.

The third largest regional trading bloc after NAFTA and the European Union, Mercosur is essentially a customs union with the aim of regional and international economic, strategic, and political integration.

But Mercosur has additional functions, addressing agendas of infrastructure, telecommunications, science and technology, education, environment, and human rights, particularly in the South American region.

With Brazil and Argentina as its primary members, (and to a lesser extent Paraguay and Uruguay) Mercosur also seeks a rapprochement with Asian counterparts, particularly regarding issues of trade, customs and value chains.

Though recent developments have focused on the European Union, Mercosur’s negotiations with the Pacific Alliance are ongoing. Mercosur seeks to integrate with other Latin American countries and Caribbean States as well, and these multiple agendas posit Mercosur as the primary vehicle for the progress of social, political and economic regional prosperity.

The fate of Mercosur’s future with the European Union in the upcoming weeks remains to be seen. While the concerns of nations such as France and Ireland over standards of agricultural cleanliness still remain, Brazil should and must take the lead in negotiations, with the aim of enhancing its power and prestige abroad in the midst of current domestic political and economic tension and turmoil.

On Wednesday, January 24, Lula was convicted of crimes of corruption and money laundering, and faces a 12 year prison sentence, which may destabilize the Brazilian polity, but should not likely complicate Temer’s goals to integrate with Mercosur.

The recent stabilization of the Brazilian economy in terms of GDP growth, lower inflation and a decreased interest rate also contribute to the likelihood of facilitated trade negotiation.

Again, the recent standoff between Mercosur and the European Union will not deter the hope for a negotiated settlement, and will not hinder the progress for future reconciliation between the two blocs.

The interests of both Mercosur and the EU should dictate some kind of resolution to stalled trade negotiations sometime in the next few weeks, serving to perpetuate the process of Brazil’s international economic integration in 2018.