The project with a total value of almost 1.1 billion reais (US$ 682 million) provides for the acquisition of the most advanced surface to surface missile launch system developed in Brazil. The Astros 2020 is an evolved version of the Astros II, the best selling product manufactured by Avibras Aerospace.

Exported to many countries the Astros (Artillery SaTuration ROcket System) is considered a market-leader among the small and highly competitive group of manufacturers of such systems.

Altogether the project includes the purchase of 49 vehicles by the Brazilian army divided into three batteries: 18 launch vehicles, 18 ammo re-supply vehicles, three fire control units, three weather stations, three recovery vehicles and three armored command and control vehicles for each battery and another final vehicle for integrated command and control.

The main advantage of the new concept is the incorporation of the AV-TM, a high precision cruise missile with a range of 300 kilometers. Unlike the rockets, which have a ballistic trajectory, defined from the impulse they receive at launch, this missile is guided and its trajectory can be controlled. Another important advance is the in the electronics system which is entirely digital.

The Astros II are normally grouped in artillery batteries consisting on average of about 13 vehicles: 6 of them are Astros II launchers, 6 are rocket resupply trucks and one a special radar-equipped vehicle controlling the fire control system. The launcher is capable of firing rockets of different calibers armed with a range of warheads.

The Astros II artillery system entered service with the Brazilian Army in 1983. The system is battle proven, having been used in action by the Iraqi Army in the Gulf Wars.

In the 1980s, Avibras sold an estimated sixty-six Astros II artillery systems to Iraq. Iraq also built the Sajil-60 which is a license-built version of the Brazilian SS-60. Sixty Astros II were sold to Saudi Arabia and an unspecified number sold to Bahrain and Qatar. Total sales of the Astros II between 1982 and 1987 reached one billion dollars.

This fact made the Astros II multiple rocket launcher the most profitable weapon produced by Avibras.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, Avibras worked almost exclusively with the manufacturing of rockets and multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS), such as the Astros II, in addition to developing antitank and anti-ship missiles.

At its peak, Avibras employed 6,000 people; later it would be reduced to 900 people in the early 1990s as the arms industry demand fell. Even so, in the first Gulf War in 1991, the Astros II was successfully used by Saudi Arabia against Iraq. Years later, the Astros II system helped Angola to defeat the UNITA rebels.

Mercopress

In fact, the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) claims in its major groundbreaking study that there are at least 45 million to 80 million small arms and light weapons in Latin America. Light weapons are defined as those operated by an individual or small group; this includes handguns, assault rifles, grenades, grenade launchers and man-portable surface to air missiles.

The proliferation of small arms threatens the safety and well-being of all Latin Americans. The widespread availability of these weapons allows conflicts to break out across the region, resulting not only in major human rights violations but also instability in local communities, as well as stalled economic development.

The United States and the Soviet Union introduced Kalashnikov rifles to Latin America during the Cold War. This facilitated the most significant flood of arms to Central America during the region's widespread civil wars of the 1980s via proxy arms dealers. For instance, Soviet weapons were exported to Cuba and later were also sent to the leftist Sandinista government in Nicaragua during the 1980s.

The United States, in turn, sent weapons to its own choice of allies, such as the right-wing Nicaraguan Contras. These weapons were funneled through the Salvadoran and Guatemalan militaries as well as by bribing the Honduran military by funding the Battalion 316. This U.S.-backed Honduran death squad operated in the country while John Negroponte was the U.S. ambassador there. In order to be able to deny U.S. involvement in the conflict, one popular method of getting weapons into these countries involved sending Soviet weaponry stockpiled in U.S. military-maintained warehouses.

The U.S. also used third parties such as Israel to avoid directly supplying, for example, the Contras with illicit weaponry, which were then spread out throughout Latin America. The Honduran military ransacked the CIA's weaponry supply for Nicaragua and in turn supplied them to the leftist Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador.

Although most legal weapons flowing to Latin America come from the US and Europe, as well as from small local, often "legal" arms industries scattered throughout the West, a significant portion of the trade is illicit. The international small arms trade lacks transparency, making it difficult to accurately estimate the volume of small arms flowing into the region.

The Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfer estimated that in 2005 Latin America legally imported at least US$ 175 million worth of small arms, light weapons, ammunition and spare parts into the region. The U.S. is estimated to have exported almost US$ 50 million worth of these types of weapons, serving as its main supplier.

According to this data, US$ 29 million worth of U.S. small arms sold to end-users in South America ended up in Colombia, some of which were sent as a part of Plan Colombia. That country suffers from an informal arms race among paramilitaries, guerrillas, and private citizens.

A study by RAND claims that there are 37 weapons trafficking routes from Panama into Colombia, 26 from Ecuador, 21 from Venezuela, and 14 from Brazil. Mexico, too, faces an arms acquisition problem. It imported US$ 10 million in small arms which was almost the equivalent to the amount that was imported by all of Central America and the Caribbean combined.

About 2,000 guns cross the border between the United States into Mexico almost every day. The guns also fuel a bloody arms race between Mexican drug cartels, which has cost the lives of 4,000 victims within the past 18 months. In order to vet this problem, President Barack Obama and Mexican President Felipe Calderón met at a North American summit in Guadalajara on August 9 and 10.

Though Obama has repeatedly stated that the U.S. must stop American guns from reaching the hands of Mexican drug cartels, gun trafficking into Mexico shows no sign of abating. As Mexican government raids continue to uncover arsenals of firearms with American origins, its rhetoric begins to ring false.

While Obama believes U.S. gun laws will constitute a major factor in ending gun trafficking into Mexico, he is not prepared to crack-down on U.S. manufacturers. The Mexican government has unsuccessfully pushed the U.S. to reinstate a ban on assault rifles with no success thus far; Obama publicly admitted last April that reinstating this ban was unlikely.

In recent months, other governments have also become part of the major clients and suppliers in the small arms market. For example, the Venezuelan government spent US$ 10 million on small arms and supplies, purchasing them mainly from Belgium. In 2005, Venezuela also purchased 100,000 AK-47s, collectively worth US$ 4 million, from Russia; this deal also included co-production rights which officially licensed Venezuela to produce the weapon domestically.

In 2005, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Chile were the largest regional producers and exporters of small arms. The movement of these weapons across neighboring borders has been facilitated by vast coastlines, porous borders, densely forested mountains with clandestine airstrips and the lack of political will to confront powerful narcotraffickers. The tri-border area of Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina is a particularly lucrative region for arms and drug traffickers.

All told, hundreds of millions of dollars worth of weapons and narcotics are smuggled through this region annually. These firearms are legally produced, sold and then diverted to the black market. Craft production, which is the small-scale, handmade production of weapons in Chile, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, and El Salvador, is further fueling illegal trade.

Though Latin America is no longer embroiled in Cold War-era conflicts, post-Cold War living conditions for the general population have yet to improve. The high poverty rates in Latin America contribute to the rampant violence in the region, where over 220 million people experience extreme poverty in Latin America and 96 million of them are completely destitute. This high degree of poverty has led to a surge in membership in international mafias and gangs which participate in criminal activities, such as the trafficking of drugs, arms and people.

As a result of a history of violence in their communities, the possession and use of weapons is understood to be socially acceptable throughout much of Latin America. The Guatemalan constitution, for instance, guarantees civilians the right to bear arms. Even before the extra-constitutional overthrow of President Zelaya, Honduras exhibited a high degree of domestic violence, as well as a growing movement to reinstate the death penalty, both indicators of socially ingrained acceptance of violence in daily life.

Despite pressure by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have yet to take effective action on the growing numbers of young people involved in gangs. According to the International Development Bank (IDB), 30 to 75 percent of Costa Rican adult females have suffered psychological abuse while 10 to 30 percent have been physically abused.

The Inter-American Children's Institute calls Latin American street children "the visible face of urban tragedy." Most gangs consist of urban males from ages 9 to 25, most of whom live in disadvantaged conditions. Their deaths as a result of violence constitute a tragic waste of a valuable resource which their nations' can ill-afford to lose.

Marginalized children become both victims and oftentimes aggressors through their involvement in gangs. There is an urgent need for action on the part of national governments regarding the control of small arms in Latin America, as well as a change in the local culture that allows the current violence to be the norm.

Nidya Sarria is a research associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) – www.coha.org. The organization is a think tank established in 1975 to discuss and promote inter-American relationship. Email: coha@coha.org.

Sometimes it seems the modus operandi of the large modern warfare businesses closely resembles the intrigues of a television soap opera. It took President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s announcement that he was leaning toward purchasing 35 fifth generation fighter planes from the French company Dassault, for the Swedish Saab and the American Boeing to fall over themselves to profess their unrequited love for all things Brazilian.

The companies are responding to the announcement that Brazil is renovating its aging fleet and also planning to create the largest military industrial complex in the southern hemisphere. On September 7, Brazil’s Independence Day, Lula and the French President Nicolas Sarkozy signed off on the purchase of five submarines, four of them conventional and one nuclear, and 50 military transport helicopters, all for a total of US$ 12 billion. At the same time, Lula announced Brazil’s intention to purchase 36 Rafale fighter jets, which would increase the financial transaction to US$ 20 billion.

The fighter jet story goes back to 1998. The Brazilian Air Force has 110 jets which were built in the 1970s and 80s and which are now too old and outdated for a country whose needs include patrolling 8 million square kilometers of territory, 17 million kilometers of national borders, and vast offshore oil platforms.

The newest aircraft are 12 Mirage 2000s, which were bought second-hand and are well past their retirement date. By contrast, Chile has 28 F-16s, and Venezuela has 24 Sukhoi 30s, both the most advanced models available.

In the running for the contract are the French Rafale, the Swedish Gripen, and Boeing’s F-18 Super Hornet. There is not much of a difference between them on a technical basis, but their prices do vary dramatically: each Gripen costs US$ 50 million, and the Rafales are priced at US$ 80 million.

The advantage that the F-18 has is that it is the most tried and tested fighter plane on offer. The French, however, have from the start guaranteed to give the Brazilians the source codes – the digital heart – of the aircraft, something Boeing is unable to do without the authorization of the US Congress.

Defesanet, the Brazilian website specializing in military affairs, maintains that the purchase of a significant arms cache is always accompanied by shady maneuvers on the sidelines, and the agreement between Lula and Sarkozy is no exception.

On the night of September 6, during a state dinner, Lula complained to Sarkozy about the “absurd price” of the Rafales. Shortly thereafter, the French president sent Lula a personal letter, stressing French willingness to participate in the “unrestricted transfer” of technological intelligence. The French president knew that this is a key issue for Brazil.(1)

Furthermore, Sarkozy raised the possibility of manufacturing the Rafale in Brazil for the Latin American market, which would reduce the overall price. That same night Lula met with his minister of Defense, Nelson Jobim, and the commander of the Air Force, as well as the ambassadors of France and Brazil to prepare the announcement, which was to be made the next day following the Independence Day military parade: Brazil was to begin negotiations with Dassault for the purchase of the 36 fighter planes and 10 K-390 military transport planes. These were to be built by the Brazilian company Embraer.

The announcement was earth shaking. The Swedish and American companies sprung into action. Two days after the announcement, on September 9, the US Embassy in Brasília released a statement defending the F-18 Super Hornet because “we believe it is better than the opposition.”(2)

The exact meaning of “unrestricted transfer” of necessary technology remained vague, but its inclusion served to increase tension among the rivals. Relations with the United States were already frayed at the edges since only months before the United States blocked the sale of Brazilian made combat planes, the Super Tucano, to Venezuela because it contained some US-produced components. Lula seemed to enjoy playing the game, at one point remarking, “At this rate we will soon get all the fighter jets for free.”

The deadline for the submission of the proposals from the three companies was extended from September 21 until October 2. On September 11 the Brazilian Air Force released a “clarification regarding the FX-2 Project” (FX-2 being the name given to the fleet renovation).

In the document, the five criteria the government would use to evaluate the various proposals were put on public record: technology transfer, Brazilian control over weaponry, international cooperation agreements with the national arms industry, and commercial and maintenance contracts. The document added that it had asked all bidders to define clearly what they meant by “unlimited and necessary technological transfer.”

In the middle of all this, on September 24, two Rafale jets fell into the Mediterranean Sea. The accident provoked much discussion in the Brazilian press, with many noting that the jets had never been sold outside France. On September 28, the Brazilian company Embraer, who will eventually have the contract of producing the jets in Brazil, gave its verdict at the request of the air force: it believed the Swedish Gripen are the best option, their advantage being that as the new generation Gripen has not been manufactured yet, the Brazilian company could “learn by producing” as they are “not interested in only making and supplying spare parts, but want to acquire and master the knowledge they don’t yet have.”(3)

On October 1st, one day before the deadline to modify proposals, the presidents of Boeing and Saab arrived in Brazil to “launch an offensive to try and derail the French advantage.”(4) On that day, Boeing distributed a communiqué that reiterated there would be a transfer of technology to Brazil, the French called upon the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to criticize the Swedish model because it existed only on paper, while the Swedes pointed out that they were the one who had promised Brazil the most voluminous technology transfer. The president of Saab, Ake Svensson, even surmised that at some point in the future, “we might become dependent on Brazilian industry.”(5)

In addition to all the wooing, France also promised it would defend Brazil’s ascent to a seat on the United Nations Security Council, a well-known ambition of Lula’s. All that has transpired this past month, the month of the Brazilian Fighter Jet soap opera, is astonishing in that it indicates just how much the world has changed: three of the biggest and most powerful companies of the northern hemisphere are pleading and cajoling with ever more promises to a southern hemisphere government who is ready to spend billions on buying their product. Lula and the National Defense Council will make their decision in the next few weeks.

National Defense Strategy

On December 15, 2008, a 70-page document was signed by President Lula, the Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim, and the head of the Office of Strategic Affairs, Roberto Mangabeira Unger. This report had taken a year to prepare, and was the work of, among others, the commanders of the Brazilian Army, Navy, and Air Force. The document is entitled “National Defense Strategy” and its aim is to present an accurate and current portrait of the state of the defense system of a country that is increasingly assuming a greater role on the international stage.(6)

The document extends its time scale to the year 2030 and encompasses short-, medium-, and long-term plans and projections in order to “modernize the national defense structure.” It incorporates a reorganization of the armed forces, and a restructuring of both the finances and the equipment of the forces. It furthermore insists that defense should focus on three principal components: cybernetics, space, and nuclear.

The major priority, however, is the decision to concentrate on the importance of combat: “In order to dissuade (an enemy) it is necessary to be prepared to engage in combat. Technology, no matter how advanced it may be, will never be an alternative to combat. It will always only be an instrument of combat.” It is here that Brazil distances itself greatly from the Pentagon, where it is believed that technology is the way to win wars that are lost on the ground. One can say that Brazil has assumed an autonomous way of thinking.

Despite noting that the Brazilian Constitution prohibits the manufacturing of nuclear weapons, the document stresses the “strategic necessity to develop and control nuclear technology.” In the beginning of September, the Brazilian press revealed that Brazil could develop nuclear weapons. The same day Sarkozy arrived in Brazil, the results of a report prepared by the Military Institute of Engineering was leaked which made clear Brazil had the capacity to produce atomic weapons.(7)

Of special mention is the proposal to look at the finances and their disbursements. The army has always directed its attention to the south, toward a possible confrontation with Argentina, an idea with an unmistakable Eurocentric influence. It has now proposed to position the army in the middle of the country, as the real territorial threat comes from the North (8) (i.e.: Plan Colombia).

The air force, currently stationed in São Paulo, and the navy in Rio de Janeiro, will have to patrol the whole of the South Atlantic, which holds the recently discovered enormous reserves of oil, which have catapulted Brazil to the seventh largest oil reserve in the world.

In addition, the navy has the job of patrolling both the mouth of the Amazon River in the North and the Paraguay-Parana in the South. Above all else, however, is protecting Brazilian unconditional sovereignty over the Amazônia region: Brazil rejects “any attempts at curtailing its decisions with respect to preserving, developing, and defending the Amazon region. Brazil alone takes care of the Brazilian Amazon, for itself and for all of humanity.”

This is one of the most sensitive points for the Brazilian military and they react speedily each time voices are raised calling for the “internationalization” of the Amazon region.

The section devoted to the national military defense industry is one of the most important. It stresses the “development of independent technology” with the objective of “progressively eliminating the purchase of imported products and services.” It asks the state to help support private arms firms and those still unprofitable but vital components of an industry in development. In return, the state will have the right to exercise a certain control over these private firms, the logic being that the nation’s defense is always placed above private interests.

This is why, whenever Brazil purchases arms, it demands with it the transfer of technological knowledge. The four conventional submarines and the 50 helicopters Brazil is buying from the French will be manufactured in Brazil. The same will happen with the fighter jets. UNASUR guarantees Brazil the Latin American market and the agreement with the French gives Brazil the exclusive access to the sale of the technology in that market.

The autonomy or independence of a country is usually defined in the intellectual realm. The National Defense Strategy reflects this maturity and independent thinking. Point 16 of the strategy document illustrates this: “It is imperative to organize a nation’s armed forces around its own capacities, not around a specific enemy.” This is a clear departure from other types of defense strategies, and, from a visionary point of view, clearly aligns itself with a philosophy of autonomy.

Toward an Autonomous Military Industrial Complex

Brazil aims to produce the majority of the military hardware it needs. It already has Embraer, the third largest aircraft manufacturer in the world, behind Boeing and Airbus. It also has Helibras, the largest producer of combat helicopters in South America, which is in partnership with EADS of Europe, and currently also makes armored tanks, a certain range of naval ship, airplanes, ammunition, and in the future plans fifth generation fighter jets and submarines. The four submarines purchased from France will be built in the shipyards of Rio.

Brazil requests technology from various countries, mainly Europe, but also from the Third World. A new Franco-Brazilian company will be created to build and arm the nuclear submarine purchased from France, while all the helicopters will be manufactured at Helibras. As for the fighter jets, the first few would be built in France but the remaining 30 will be produced by Embraer, having thus acquired the necessary knowledge to manufacture the latest generation of fighter jets.

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim was unequivocal in this respect: “The transaction involving the Rafale is not merely a purchase, because they will be manufactured in Brazil and there will be the possibility that they will then be sold throughout Latin America.”(9)

And so Brazil will begin to play in the big leagues of the arms trade. It has even managed to secure a place within that select club of manufacturers of nuclear submarines which, until now, consisted only of the United States, Great Britain, Russia, China, and France, coincidentally the five permanent members of the Security Council.

The former ambassador of Brazil in Colombia, Julio Cesar Gomes dos Santos, remarked that “the countries that buy arms are vulnerable because they are dependent on the supply of spare parts. Chavez has grounded F-16s because the Americans will not send him a single screw. Brazil has a defense industry so it has only to depend on itself. Brazil does not buy arms. We are entering into a business arrangement whereby we buy the first few planes only if the next are built in Brazil under the condition that they may be sold in the Latin American region. That is the difference.”(10)

The military expert Juan Gabriel Tokatlian says that it is “one thing to be an emerging power in Asia, like India, or in Africa, like South Africa, but it is quite astonishing to do it in this part of the world usually considered to be the backyard of the United States.”(11) It is precisely for this reason that Brazil needs to distance itself gradually from the United States, without aggression or jubilation.

Nevertheless, as admirable as the steps toward autonomy are, Brazil still lags far behind the United States. Brazil proposes to spend US$ 15 billion on defense, while the United States spends US$ 500 billion. In 2006, only 0.6% of Brazil’s gross domestic product (GDP) was spent on defense research and development, while the figures for the United States are 56%, for Spain 24%, and for France 23%.(12)

A Rising Power in the US Backyard

The recent treaty between Colombia and the United States allowing the latter country to use seven military bases in Colombia provoked much high-level military discussion in the Brazilian press. Luis Eduardo Paiva Rocha, retired general and professor at Brazil’s Officer Training Academy, published an article in Defesanet provocatively entitled, “Strategic short-sightedness and military indigence are the biggest threats to Brazilian sovereignty.”(13)

The general criticizes the “populist hysteria” of the Bolivian leadership with regard to the Colombian military bases and points out that neither Brazil nor any other neighboring country presented an alternative: “The Colombian bases to be used by the United States would not present a problem for Brazil if Brazil had the military power which reflects the international standing in the world it purports to have. What threatens us is our weakness because ‘amongst other things, to be unarmed is to be insignificant (Machiavelli).'”

He adds that “the Brazilian Armed Forces are completely incapable of resisting an invasion from a modern military power.” The threats will most probably come from those attempting to gain control of the riches of the Amazon or the oil reserves of the South Atlantic. The current commander of the navy, Julio Soares de Moura Neto, responded much in the same vein when asked to comment on the French deal by the Folha de S. Paulo: “Brazilians must become aware of the fact that we have enormous wealth in the sea and the navy must be constantly on alert in order to defend the nation’s sovereignty.”(14)

The admiral continues by warning that the risks have increased dramatically now that Brazil is not only an emerging economic power but also a potential oil-producing super-state. One comment in particular reveals the changed attitude toward the United States: when George Bush reactivated the Fourth Fleet and deployed it to the South Atlantic, the decision “was conveyed to Brazil neither politically nor diplomatically.”

This must be why Lula, sure that Brazil is well on its way to becoming a great power in the 21st century, is also building the framework which will ensure that the country can defend itself militarily. Brazil will have the largest navy in Latin America as well as the largest air force. It will have the only military industrial complex in the region. The fact that it has sought the help of France, a country that has so openly maintained its political and military independence from Washington, is very significant.

It is possible, as maintained by the analysts of Dedefensa, that Washington will regard the actions of both Brazil and France as a “declaration of war.”(15) This development would fit in perfectly with the world vision as seen by the elites who benefit most from the Washington Consensus.

The situation was perhaps best summarized by the Italian Dario Azzellini, a specialist in the “new wars”: “War is no longer needed to establish a new economic model – war itself is the model.”(16)

Raúl Zibechi is an international analyst for Brecha of Montevideo, Uruguay, lecturer and researcher on social movements at the Multiversidad Franciscana de América Latina, and adviser to several social groups. He writes the monthly “Zibechi Report” for the Americas Program (www.americasprogram.org).

Translated from “Brasil emerge como potencia militar” by Isabella Weibrecht.

Today Embraer’s military products make it an increasing factor in the arms manufacturing and supplying field, along with several other transnational arms companies currently competing to be major international weapons suppliers.

Embraer’s history can be traced back to the Brazilian military junta that ruled the country from 1964 to 1985. When Embraer was founded in 1969, the junta was led by General Emilio Medici, who wanted the country to have its own self-contained aircraft-manufacturing company, with the state controlling 51% of the shares.

While Embraer is commonly mentioned today as Brazil’s major military industrial complex, it should be recalled that it also was one of three such companies in Brazil during military rule and afterwards. As its name suggests, Embraer focused on aircraft, with the Tucano becoming its flagship military product.

The other prominent Brazilian military industries were Avibrás Indústria Aeroespacial S.A. (Avibrás), which was established in 1961, and Engenheiros Especializados S.A. (Engesa), which began its operations in 1963.

Globalsecurity.org explains that “by 1980 Brazil had become a net exporter of arms. On the demand side, the rapid success resulted from a growing need in the developing world for armaments,” specifically, those that met specialized performance and cost qualifications.

“On the supply side, Brazil’s arms exports were designed for developing world markets and were noted for their high quality, easy maintenance, good performance in adverse conditions, and low cost.”

In the course of the Iraq-Iran War in the late 1980s, Iraq would become a major client of the Brazilian military industry. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reports that 40% of all Brazilian arms transfers from 1985 to 1989 went to Iraq. The armaments included over 800 armored fighting vehicles (EE-3/-9/-11) and over 60 ASTROS rocket launchers.

In 1989, Brazil chose to sell Tucanos, Embraer’s relatively low cost and basic military aircraft, to Iran, showing that business and financial factors trumped any particular ideological preference for Iraq.

In contrast to Embraer’s strong sales to both sides in the Iran-Iraq War, its competitor, Engesa, did not encounter such success. In the late 1980s the company showcased its newest battle tank, the EE-TI Osorio but due to changing political tides was unable to land customers for the product. Despite Saudi Arabia’s initial interest in the Osorio, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait prompted the Saudi Royal family, in near panic, to turn to the U.S. as its main military supplier.

Left without its prime customer, Engesa was forced to declare bankruptcy in 1993. In order to shield its domestic military industry, the Brazilian government privatized Embraer under Plan Collor, as part of president Fernando Collor de Mello strategy to privatize state-run companies to save them from bankruptcy.

Today Embraer stands as the undisputed leader of the Brazilian military and civilian aircraft industry. In an interview, Dr. Thomaz Costa, Professor of National Security Affairs at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, explains that “[Embraer’s] business philosophy seems to reflect a market position defined by producing platforms with technology, electronic components, and had a large array of private stock of parts available in its on-site global market. Its products directed to civilian markets are based in cost-effectiveness of product life cycle.”

Dr. Costa argues that “Embraer has been successful in identifying market niches before the market fully develop demands (i.e., the Bandeirante and the ERJ for commuter services, the Tucano for military training, and the new series 90-120 seater airlines).”

For Embraer, 2004 was a “golden year,” as it delivered 148 civilian and military aircrafts. A 2005 Military Technology article indicated that at the time Embraer had invested around US$ 45 million on its Gavião Peixoto floor workers. However, in recent years the company has suffered from the ongoing global financial crisis and continues to receive more bad news.

In February 2009, Embraer announced its plan to cut as much as 20% of its active worldwide workforce of 21,362, including both management and production. According to an Agence France Presse article, Embraer’s shares slid nearly two percent to US$ 14.50 on the New York Stock Exchange immediately following the announcement.

Furthermore, another bad blow occurred when the Chinese-owned Hainan Airlines Co. announced in May that it would reduce its order of ER145 passenger jets from the original 50 to 25 (12 planes already had been delivered). Embraer announced that “over 90 percent of its revenues are generated abroad,” leaving it particularly vulnerable to the global economic recession.

The Civilian Division

Embraer’s civilian wing is also a critical part of its industry. As NDU’s Dr. Costa explains, “the military portion of Embraer is pretty small compared to the civilian component. It is very similar to Boeing, where one division produces the F-18, but the bulk of the revenues and commanding business model is civilian.” An example of Embraer’s record-making financial gains occurred in 2008 when the company reported it had gained US$ 175 million in the third-quarter of that year.

Like the military division, civilian products are largely export-based and similarly susceptible to the international economic environment. Prior to the devastating hit generated by the financial crisis, Embraer had made deliveries to U.S. carrier Northwest Airlines in 2007, and in 2008 there were talks of the company’s E-190 passenger jet being sold to JetBlue.

Also in 2008, the company sold 6 type-170 jets to EgyptAir Holding Co. for US$ 189 million. According to a January 2009 report in the Associated Press Financial Wire, Embraer delivered 204 planes in 2008, a 21% increase over the 169 jets delivered in 2007. Given their previous reliance on sales of midsize and executive jets, it is not surprising that the company has taken a particularly strong hit from the current economic crisis as demand for these aircraft falls..

What military aircrafts is Embraer producing these days?

In spite of its current troubled financial situation, the nascent Brazilian military industry is producing a number of potentially successful products (its civilian aircraft line aside). While it is no longer turning out the Tucano, the company has upgraded to the Super Tucano. Today, Embraer’s top military products include:

* The ALX Super Tucano which can be used as a training aircraft as well as for patrol and light attack missions. In 2008, Embraer presented an upgraded version which consisted of TOSS (Training and Operation Support System) computer systems with improved capabilities like a Mission Planning Station for navigation and planning attack missions.

* The AMX light attack aircraft and its AMX-T two-seat, combat-capable trainer version.

* The P99 MP/ASW aircraft and the EMB military versions which can be used for remote sensing and maritime patrol.

* The KC-390 medium transport/tanker aircraft, which was announced in April 2009 at the Latin American Aero and Defense show in Rio de Janeiro. The plane was designed to compete with the now aging U.S. workhorse, the C-130.

Russia announced in April 2009 that Embraer might join the Russian-Indian joint venture of producing the fifth-generation fighter aircraft (FGFA) version of the famous Sukhoi fighter. Currently, the aircraft is being developed by Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation and India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, following a 2007 agreement.

“We are discussing with the well-known Brazilian company Embraer the transfer of technology and the construction of facilities for the future licensed production of aircraft, including FGFA,” said deputy director of Moscow’s Federal Service on Military-Technical Cooperation, Alexander Fomin.

Iñigo Guevara, a specialist in Latin American defense industries and a CONACYT fellow at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, explained: “The current FX2 program, which will lead to the selection of the Rafale, JAS-39 Gripen or F/A-18E Super Hornet to become Brazil’s next generation fighter, will see a fair amount of technology transferred to Embraer, which will enable it to license, produce and eventually develop a fifth generation fighter.”

He goes on to explain that the new generation of fighters would be of considerable interest to the contemporary global market, and would nicely position Brazil alongside the U.S., Russia, China, France, and Sweden as making up an elite group independently developing and producing jet fighters.

Non-Embraer Initiatives

It is important to highlight that Embraer is not the only Brazilian military plant currently creating production lines. Other examples of promising military-related companies include:

* AVIBRAS, which produces the ASTROS self propelled MLR batteries.

* AGRALE, which produces the Marrua jeep.

* The Brazilian Army, in cooperation with IVECO, produces the VBPT-MR (Urutu-3) armored personnel carrier.

Projects for the production of heavy battle tanks, like the attempts to promote the Osorio in the 1980s and 1990s, are notably absent. According to Guevara, Brazil is not pushing for an in-country fabricated battle tank, such as the Osorio or Tamoio, “because Brazilian planners do not envisage a large enough need for a tank in Brazil’s list of defense requirements in its current or future export market.”

This explains why Brazil has recently purchased 250 German Leopard 1 battle tanks. Purchasing already established tank models becomes more effective and offers less logistical problems than designing and building a Brazilian model from the ground up.

Embraer’s Domestic Deals

Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim declared in April 2009 that Embraer will develop a new fleet of military transport aircraft for the Brazilian Air Force. Brazil currently uses the aging American C-130 Hercules, which soon will be replaced by Embraer’s KC-390. The plane is capable of transporting Brazil’s 20-ton Urutu III armored personnel carriers.

Embraer’s hope is that this will be the first of a new batch of contracts for their new military aircraft division that would reverse their losses and lay-offs from recent months. Embraer also announced in April that it had signed a contract to modernize 12 Brazilian navy jets, including 9 AF-1s and 3 AF-1As.

According to a report by Defense Daily, “this upgrading is designed to fully restore the operating capacity of the navy’s 1st Intercept and Attack Plane Squadron.” Frederico Fleury Curado, Embraer’s president and CEO, has declared that “by choosing Embraer, the navy is making an important contribution to consolidating the technological and industrial capacity of [Brazil’s defense industry] for modernizing military aircrafts.”

Brazilian Arms Merchant to Whom?

Embraer will have to compete with other military industrial companies if it wishes to establish itself as a leading global arms merchant of military aircraft. Such companies in countries like the U.S., Russia, and China have increasingly consolidated themselves as suppliers of weaponry for a number of Latin American and other developing countries.

Europe, both as a collective unit and as individual states, has also attempted to gain footholds in the Latin American market, with mixed results. Guevara argues that Embraer has established a name for itself as it provides “western technology at an affordable price.” Dr. Sean Burges, an expert on Brazilian affairs at the University of Ottawa and a COHA Senior Research Fellow, explains that “Super Tucanos are not up to taking on a Mig or F-18, but they’re pretty damn effective against a Cessna aircraft, a truck, or even a tank. [This makes the Brazilian warplanes good for] low-level border war and anti-narcotics aircraft work.”

Besides affordability, a major reason for developing countries’ demand for Embraer models is the company’s production of aircraft which are suitable for specialized missions and immediate threat responses, which do not require the high-performance attack aircraft like those produced by the U.S. and Russia.

In 2005, Embraer and Colombia signed an agreement to supply the Colombian Air Force with twenty-five Super Tucano turboprops, all of which have now been delivered. In July 2008, India signed an agreement to purchase three EMB 145 AEW&C (Airborne Early Warning & Control) planes. The first delivery is scheduled for 2011.

In August 2008, Chile signed an agreement to buy twelve Super Tucanos, with the Brazilian media estimating the deal at US$ 120 million. “We are very proud to announce that the Super Tucano is the aircraft chosen by the Chilean Air Force, which is internationally recognized for the high professional capacity of its personnel,” said Luiz Carlos Aguiar, Embraer’s Executive Vice President of Defense and Government Market.

More recently, in January 2009, the Thai military purchased one ERJ 135 for civilian and military transport. The Royal Thai Army and Navy ordered two similar aircrafts in 2008 as well. That same month the Dominican Republic purchased eight Super Tucanos for border patrol and anti-drug operations. In March 2009, Ecuador bought twenty-four Super Tucanos for training and border patrol missions.

Perhaps due to the growing commercialization of Embraer’s production line, Jane’s Defense Weekly reported in March 2009 that Colombia expressed interest in co-developing Embraer’s C-390 medium-heavy transport aircraft. In 2008 there were also reports that Bolivia was interested in acquiring Super Tucanos to replace its venerable but aging T-33 trainer/light attack aircrafts scheduled to be retired in 2010.

Working with government institutions, Embraer and Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES), Brazil’s state-run export financing institution, supplied Guatemala with a US$ 99 million loan to purchase an anti-drug trafficking system. The catch is that Guatemala will appropriate the funds advanced by the Brazilian government to purchase a radar system and six Super Tucanos. The deal was announced in June 2009 when Brazilian President Lula visited Guatemala.

For CONACYT fellow Guevara, “Embraer has focused on emerging markets such as Latin America, as well as North Africa and the Middle East, which are its natural clients; it also managed to penetrate NATO markets, such as France, Greece and the UK.” France may be an obvious development, given its great interest in becoming a close ally of Brazil in recent years. On the other hand, for Dr. Costa, “the decision to buy Embraer products seems to show clear attention to cost components and less of political alignment.”

What remains to be seen is how the U.S. will respond to Embraer as a direct competitor with American military suppliers. In 2008, EP Aviation, a subsidiary of Blackwater Worldwide/XE, the world’s largest private security contractor, purchased a Super Tucano.

The aircraft, which was sold to EP Aviation, did not include the two .50mm-caliber machine guns that are normally wing-mounted. In 2008, there was talk of preliminary negotiations with U.S. authorities regarding the purchase of eight Super Tucanos which would be sent to Iraq for training purposes.

Rising Global Power

According to Guevara, “Brazil has the region’s most advanced and developed defense industries. Over the past two decades it has focused on developing efficient support equipment but now it is interested in developing heavier conventional capabilities. Submarines, armored personnel carriers and fighter jets are among its main requirements.”

Meanwhile, Burges notes “if you have planes and the other doesn’t, you have air superiority, it is all a question of relative capability.” Embraer rose in recent years as a very important military and civilian aircraft manufacturer of efficient and affordable products.

Developing nations will most likely continue to see the Brazilian company as an increasingly important and diversified weapons’ supplier for the immediate future.

In the greater scheme of things, Embraer’s success, current financial issues aside, is another propellant that will elevate Brazil to a higher level of importance, as it continues to evolve into an ever more influential regional player and growing world power.

Alex Sanchez is a research fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) – www.coha.org. The organization is a think tank established in 1975 to discuss and promote inter-American relationship. Email: coha@coha.org.

Brazil has a long established arms industry which includes ground, air and sea equipment plus incipient missiles and a satellite launching pad in the north of the country next to the equator line.

Argentina on the other hand has had an erratic experience dating back to mid 20th century with ups and downs and a strong development of missile technology, dismantled during the President Carlos Menem years, and nuclear energy.

This defense production accord and several others relating to scientific, technological, space and nuclear cooperation were ironed out during a seven hours meeting of Argentine and Brazilian staff in Rio do Janeiro over the weekend.

Presidents Lula and Cristina Fernandez are also schedule to talk about the current Doha round global trade negotiations and the latest drafts for a possible trade summit sometime in late March.

According to Argentina's International Economic Relations Secretary Alfredo Chiaradia there are still "170 contentious issues" pending contrary to the interests of agriculture exporting countries such as Argentina and Brazil.

The Buenos Aires press speculates there could be an official statement from Mercosur on the WTO trade talks.

Other items in the bilateral agenda are the coming Rio Group summit in the Dominican Republic, which was shunned by Mr. Kirchner but that Mrs. Kirchner in her international relations push wants to signal a strong Argentine presence; the South American presidents summit scheduled to take place in Bogota, Colombia at the end of the month and which the Brazilian diplomacy is interested in promoting and finally the South-South summit between Mercosur, South Africa and India leaders that has been scheduled for mid 2008 in Buenos Aires.

Mercopress

Brazil should develop the technological capacity to manufacture nuclear
weapons, one of the country’s top generals declared in a television interview
earlier this month. The remark was delivered in the context of a turn by the
Workers Party government of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva towards a
dramatic increase in military spending.

The hike is an effort to build back up the country’s armed forces, which have been severely discredited since the end of the military dictatorship more than two decades ago.

“If the government agrees, we need to have the ability in the future to develop a nuclear weapon,” said General José Benedito de Barros Moreira, one of Brazil’s few four-star generals and a former head of the country’s War College.

Barros Moreira, who is presently a senior official in Brazil’s Ministry of Defense, in charge of formulating the country’s military strategy, compared the weapon to a “lock” needed to safeguard Brazil’s resources.

The startling comment came in a roundtable discussion on the program Expressão Nacional broadcast Tuesday night by TV Câmara, the network run by Brazil’s congress. The general appeared together with two congressional deputies, Jose Genoíno of the Workers Party and Raul Jungmann of the Popular Socialist Party, as well as Antonio Jorge Ramalho da Rocha, of the National University of Brazil’s Institute of International Relations.

“We should be technologically prepared to produce a nuclear device,” said the general. He added, “No country can feel safe if it doesn’t develop technology that enables it to defend itself when necessary.”

Barros Moreira said that Brazil’s resources made it a “target” for foreign aggression. “The world lacks water, energy, food and minerals,” he said. “Brazil is rich in all of these. For this reason we must put a strong lock on our door.”

Significantly, the two legislators both found themselves largely in agreement with the general. Genoíno, an anti-government guerrilla under the military dictatorship, rose to the presidency of the Workers Party (PT), and became one of the central figures in a political bribe and kickback scandal that led the country’s attorney general to declare him a leader of a criminal organization.

He spoke in terms of Brazil’s need to have armed forces to “match its economic and political projection in the world” and to support “the projection of power in the world and region.”

Jungmann, an ex-member of the Stalinist Brazilian Communist Party who has faced his own charges of embezzlement of public funds while he served as agrarian reform minister under the government of President Fernando Cardoso, talked about Brazil becoming a “global player” – using the English phrase – and the need to attend to the “viability of our armed forces.”

Both legislators lamented the financial neglect of the armed forces, with Genoino railing indignantly against the “poverty wages” paid to generals and admirals.

Neither they, nor anyone else on the program, bothered to mention that the reduction of appropriations for the Brazilian military was bound up with the overwhelming popular repudiation of an institution responsible for the murder, torture and imprisonment of tens of thousands Brazilian workers, peasants, students and political oppositionists, including some whom the two deputies presumably once regarded as their comrades.

The subject of the television round table discussion was the move by the Lula government to fulfill the Defense Ministry’s request for a 50 percent hike in arms spending for the coming year, raising military appropriations from their current level of US$ 3.5 billion to well over US$ 5 billion. It is widely anticipated that the government will revive plans that were shelved in 2002 to purchase new fighter jets and to develop a nuclear submarine.

While the Defense Ministry and the Lula government have officially denied any connection, the discussion of the proposed military buildup in Brazil’s right-wing media has focused on a supposed challenge posed by the multi-million-dollar arms purchases made by the Venezuelan government of President Hugo Chavez from Russia, including 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles and fighter planes.

Two days after the general’s televised remarks, Brazil’s Defense Minister, Nelson Jobim, spoke at a military conference in Rio de Janeiro in support of building a nuclear submarine, claiming that such a weapons system was needed to defend recently discovered off-shore oil reserves.

“When you have a large natural source of wealth discovered in the Atlantic, it’s obvious you need the means to protect it,” Jobim said.

The Brazilian military had sought the development of a nuclear submarine during the period of the dictatorship, which ruled the country from 1964 to 1985. During the period in which he had emerged as a national figure for his leading role in a series of massive metalworkers strikes in defiance of military rule, Lula had denounced the proposed submarine program as a diversion of resources that were needed to meet the country’s vast social needs.

Now, as president, he has emerged as a champion of realizing the Brazilian military’s old dream. Last July, Lula announced the appropriation of US$ 540 million to fund the navy’s nuclear enrichment program, the first installment of what is expected to be more than US$ 1.2 billion for the building of a nuclear submarine.

“Brazil could rank among those few nations in the world with a command of uranium enrichment technology, and I think we will be more highly valued as a nation – as the power we wish to be,” he said at the time.

In his speech, Defense Minister Jobim insisted that Brazil’s uranium enrichment program would be used solely for the submarine program and dismissed the idea that it would be utilized for the production of a nuclear weapon. “That’s total nonsense,” he said, while making no reference to the proposal made by General Barros Moreira expressing the exact opposite viewpoint.

The more perceptive voices in the Brazilian media, however, treated the general’s opinions as anything but “nonsense.” Folha de S. Paulo political columnist Jânio de Freitas, for example, wrote that in his remarks Barros Moreira “went much further, in objectivity and clarity, than Jobim. He went, strictly speaking, to the very end: he spoke of the necessity of Brazil mastering the entire cycle of nuclear energy, which includes, more than the submarine, nuclear explosive devices.”

“How far attending to this alleged necessity has already proceeded is almost a mystery, as is normal for military projects,” continued Freitas, who noted that the Brazilian navy had long ago assembled qualified personnel and equipment to begin nuclear enrichment.

The columnist noted that the Lula government has enjoyed the complicity of the Bush administration in concealing the extent and nature of its nuclear program. Washington, he reports, “managed to get the International Atomic Energy Agency to pretend to be satisfied with verbal explanations, after being blocked when it tried to inspect the characteristics, and thereby deduce the possible aims, of the Brazilian installations for uranium enrichment.”

He noted that the US attitude toward nuclear developments in Brazil is precisely the opposite of that taken toward similar developments in Iran, where the government has submitted to extensive inspections.

There is no doubt that Washington has tilted strongly towards Brasília, promoting the Lula government as a counterweight to the influence exerted by the left-nationalism of Venezuela’s Chavez on the continent. Lula has encouraged this alignment, both with the deployment of the Brazilian military as “peacekeepers” in Haiti – freeing up US Marines for the occupation of Iraq – and in the recent ethanol treaty with Bush.

In conclusion, Freitas wrote: “The motive for the change being introduced in Brazil is obscure, but it is already known that the dimensions of its effects, internal and external, can only be great and grave.”

Brazil is not building up its military – and potentially pursuing nuclear weapons – because of some perceived threat from Venezuela. If anything, the political demonization of Chavez and Venezuela’s recent arms deals have merely been employed by the Brazilian military and its backers as a useful pretext for promoting rearmament.

Nor, obviously, is there any groundswell of popular support for increased military spending, much less a nuclear arms program. The one political figure most identified with supporting a Brazilian bomb – the recently deceased right-wing nationalist deputy and former presidential candidate Enéas Carneiro of the Party for the Reconstruction of the National Order (PRONA) – was turned into an object of public ridicule over the proposal.

Nonetheless, there are profound objective forces underlying the drive by Brazil’s ruling circles to pursue renewed military power, including nuclear weapons. The international arena is characterized by the increasingly sharp and open conflicts between the rival capitalist nation states over the control of resources and markets.

This process has found its most acute expression in the eruption of American militarism, as Washington seeks to exploit its military superiority to offset its relative economic decline, launching two wars of aggression for control of energy-rich regions in the course of the last seven years.

General Moreira Barros’s warnings about Brazil becoming a “target” for potential wars over increasingly scarce sources of energy, water and food reflects the emerging reality of a build-up towards a new period of worldwide conflagration. At the same time, the Brazilian ruling elite has its own increasing regional and global profit interests, and is prepared to utilize military force to further them.

While, no doubt, the Workers Party government will promote militarism and a revived nuclear program with the politics of nationalism, these developments pose an ominous threat to the Brazilian working class.

As a result, it will confront growing attacks on its living standards, the increasing power of a military that relinquished its dictatorial grip over the country little more than two decades ago and the prospect of being dragged into a catastrophic world war.

The article appeared originally in http://www.wsws.org.

While this does not signify that any aspiration for a return of a Soviet-style Cold War-era sphere of influence is in the offing, it is important to understand the actual depth of Russia's burgeoning presence and the range of influence being exercised by it within the region's military establishments.

Moscow's developing bilateral security relations with Latin American governments have become a matter of some concern for Washington.

Venezuela

The Russia-Venezuela arms trade has generated, by far, the most international attention. In 2006, Venezuela startled the world by announcing a significant weapons purchase from Moscow: 100,000 Kalishnikov assault rifles, 24 Sukhoi (SU-30) fighter jets, and 53 military helicopters.

The eventual price tag on the unfolding deal came close to US$ 3 billion. The aircraft already have begun to be delivered to Venezuela, with the first two arriving on December 8 2006, at the Lieutenant Luis del Valle Garcia Air Base.

Another component increasingly tying Caracas and Moscow together is the continuous flow of military personnel, such as pilots and technicians, flying in both directions to provide and receive training. Venezuelan pilots already are receiving flight instructions from Russian teachers, while Russian technicians have traveled to Venezuela to instruct local mechanics on how to maintain the newly purchased and relatively sophisticated Russian equipment.

Also, plans are being laid out to construct a factory capable of the mass production of the Russian AK automatic rifles in Maracay, Venezuela's Aragua State. It is expected that the facility will be operational by 2010, producing as many as 50,000 units per year.

There are numerous reports that Venezuela will also buy an indeterminate number of Antonov model 76 transport planes (which will replace the US-made C-130s), as well as three Amur-class submarines. The number of transport aircraft that Venezuela might purchase has not been specified, however sources close to the deal speak of a "large consignment."

The most recent Venezuelan acquisitions occurred early this year when it was announced that Caracas would buy ten to 12 TOR-M1 anti-aircraft defense missile system from Moscow. The BBC reprinted an article by the Caracas' daily El Nacional where it quotes a retired member of Venezuela's Presidential General Staff, General Alberto Muller Rojas, as saying: "I do not know if there will be more, but 12 is too few; in any case, there will be 12 batteries. To prevent an air attack, more missiles are needed."

Such a statement coming from someone who is known to be very close to President Hugo Chávez fortifies the likelihood of a higher volume of military purchases with Moscow appearing more than willing to oblige. In addition, Muller Rojas' intriguing statement poses the question of exactly who might attempt to carry out such an air assault against Venezuela.

Argentina

Last October, Argentine Defense Minister Nilda Garre met with Russian deputy prime minister Sergey Ivanov -  who also served until recently as defense minister -  when the former handed Ivanov a list of equipment that Argentina might be interested in acquiring.

The Russian ITAR-TASS news agency has quoted Garre as saying, "apart from helicopters and air-defense systems, Argentina is most interested in air-traffic-control equipment." It is unclear exactly what type of technology was on Garre's wish list.

After the meeting, minister Ivanov said that Argentine officials gave him a list of weaponry they would like to buy from Russia. However, in a press release that was later distributed in Buenos Aires, Garre stated that Argentina was possibly less interested in purchasing weaponry than buying four 3D radar systems to monitor air traffic entering the country's airspace.

The Ivanov-Garre meeting came after a compelling presentation by the Russian arms export company Rosoboronexport at the influential Sinprode-2006 exhibition in Buenos Aires.

As Buenos Aires regains its financial strength after the meltdown that started at the beginning of the decade, its desire to strengthen its arm forces by purchasing military equipment has resurfaced once again. For years, Argentina has vocalized its interest in purchasing new patrol boats and helicopters, though these efforts were repeatedly deferred as a result of the devastating effects of the 2001 economic crisis.

Rosoboronexport's recent display of its product-line in Argentina proved to local military officials that the Russian firm is in a position to provide a wide range of equipment that the nation's armed forces covet: T-90SK tanks, BTR-80A and BTR-90 armored transporters, the Iskander-E missile system, Sukhoi fighters, the Mi-171Sh, Mi-17V-5, Mi-35M, Ka-27PS and Ka-3 helicopter models. The package of possible purchase orders also included Murena-E patrol boats and batteries of anti-aircraft missile systems.

It is certain that there will be much concern in Washington over any deals between Moscow and Buenos Aires regarding military sales. On that subject, Garre has declared that: "Buenos Aires is not afraid of a negative reaction from the USA regarding possible purchases of Russian armaments […] I believe that purchasing arms is the sovereign right of every country, and this cannot displease anyone."

Peru

Since the General Juan Velasco Alvarado military government (1968-75), Peru has looked to Russia for military technology. Under his government, Velasco upgraded the country's military for one, if unstated, main reason: an eventual war with its longtime nemesis Chile.

After hard bargaining with Washington, Velasco purchased a broad range of Soviet weaponry, particularly heavy armor and jet fighters. During the recent Alejandro Toledo and the current Alan Garcí­a administrations, Peru's top military and political leaders have continued to look upon Russia as their traditional source for weaponry. Moscow also has been interested in preserving this relationship, in fact, even trying to enhance it.

Last November, Latin American department director at the Russian foreign ministry, Alexander Dogadin, toured a number of Latin American nations, including Peru, where he declared that: "Peru is our traditional regional partner, and we are broadening bilateral relations in various spheres."

In 2005, Lima and Moscow signed a deal to upgrade the country's aging Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopter fleet. Rosoboronexport has agreed to repair the country's 13 helicopters at a total cost of $18 million. That year also saw the signing of a deal in which Lima agreed to purchase five Mi-35M armored helicopters and five Antonov An-32/Cline transport aircraft, worth a total of $140 million. The delivery terms are still unclear.

Brazil

During their meeting last December in Brasilia between Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov and his Brazilian counterpart, Celso Amorim, prospects for a major weapons purchase were discussed. The Brazilian media has reported that the final deal would consist of 30 Russian military attack and transport helicopters, worth about US$ 400 million, which would be consigned by Brasilia to fight smuggling and drug trafficking. However, it remains uncertain if this purchase will ever take place, as negotiations are still going on.

Cuba

In an interesting development, Agence France Presse has reported that Cuba's interim leader, Raul Castro (who also has headed the country's armed forces for decades), signed a military technical cooperation deal with Russia in 2006.

Given Fidel Castro's fragile health, the fact that his likely successor is already playing a role, albeit a relatively small one, to renew Cuba's traditionally strong ties with Russia, might be a preview of what the country's military policy would be like under Raul Castro.

A provocative statement of a renewed Havana-Moscow defense relationship was articulate by Viktor Baranets' "Doctrine Moved Up to the Front" published in the March 7 2007 issue of Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper. Regarding the proposed missile defense shield Washington plans to build, with bases throughout Central and Eastern Europe, Baranets argued:

"How much clearer it would be to both Russians and Americans and to all of NATO if we adopted a symmetrical response that was very easy to understand – say, by deploying our own missile-attack early-warning stations or space-based missile defense systems on the territory of friendly countries like Cuba or Venezuela." It seems only logical to conclude that that Cuban military purchases will soon take place.

Colombia

In 2001, Colombia purchased six Russian attack helicopters, type Mi-17 IV version, which were delivered the following year. The deal was worth US$ 36 million. According to reports, all six helicopters were equipped with night vision devices. A spokesman for Rosoboronexport, Boris Alekseyev, declared at the time of the sale, that the helicopters "ideally meet the needs of the Colombian army, as they are two times cheaper than their American counterparts, they can effectively act in mountain conditions and rapidly move whole army units."

In spite of the special ties that Colombia has with the U.S., Bogotá seems to have no problem purchasing weapons and filling Moscow's coffers with some of the nearly one billion dollars it is likely to have received from the U.S. by the end of this year.

Mexico

Mexico has carried out a small but interesting military arm purchasing program. Between 1999 and 2000, Mexico City bought two An-32/Cline transport aircraft and two Mi-25 attack military helicopters, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

In 2002, the Mexican navy purchased Dzhigit launchers and portable Igla/SA-18 Grousse anti-aircraft missiles. According to SIPRI, this last deal was worth $2.1 million for 30 missiles and 5 launchers. At the time, the Russian news agency ITAR-TASS quoted Julio Cesar Lizarraga, a member of the Mexican lower house and also of its navy commission, saying that the purchase "will double the navy's ability" to protect offshore oil deposits in Campeche Sound against possible a terrorist attack. Purchases continued in 2004 and 2005, when the Mexican military bought around 100 Russian-made Ural heavy off-road vehicles.

On November 2006 ITAR-TASS also reported the opening of a training center for pilots of Mi-17 helicopters equipped with a unique Russian-made simulator last. The facility is situated at a naval base in the state of Veracruz. Mexican Secretary of the Navy Admiral Marco Antonio Peyrot Gonzalez headed the high-level delegation attending the opening ceremony. Furthermore, under the terms of a Mexico City-Moscow, Russian specialists will routinely travel to Mexico to provide maintenance services to around 80 Mi-17 helicopters.

The Latin American Military Balance

During his trip to Brazil, Lavrov huffily declared to an audience of distinguished citizens that "We are not selling [weapons] to any country that violates international laws."

Meanwhile, General Raul Isaias Baduel, Venezuela's defense minister, has justified his government's purchases, explaining "all our acquisitions are strictly for defense."

While this statement may be true, it cannot be denied that at a certain point Moscow's military sales may have gradually altered the geo-security landscape of much of the Americas. These results are not likely to please Washington policymakers.

Long time foes Peru and Chile periodically accuse each other of embarking on a unilateral arms race that threatens the other's national security. Lima's upgrading of its helicopter fleet has raised eyes in Santiago, particularly as it comes at the same time as the purchase of a number of Lupo-class Italian frigates.

Concerns have been expressed in Brazil, as expressed in an August 2006 article in the Brazilian newspaper Correio Braziliense, which was reproduced by the BBC. The article details that Brazil recently made an order for 12 Mirage 2000 aircrafts (with 15 to 20 years of service in the Armée de l'Air, the French air force).

The asking price was $100 million; however, the resulting economic savings have been cancelled out by certain political and security sacrifices, in which Brazil lost out to Chile and Venezuela in terms of maintaining absolute air supremacy.

Felipe Salles, editor of the electronic magazine Base Militar and a defense expert, was quoted in the Correio article as observing that: "the United States is always reluctant to sell advanced weapons, like BVR (Beyond Visual Range) missiles and laser-guided bombs, on our continent. Probably, the Russians will have no reservations."

This was in reference to Chile and Venezuela's jet fighter purchases, and Santiago buying F-16 planes, with Caracas being already blocked by Washington from acquiring spare parts for its existing feet of F-l6s, resulting in the purchase of the Sukhois.

Finally, Caracas' military purchases have raised wary eyes in both Washington and Bogotá. While it is ludicrous to believe that Venezuela may pose a security threat to the U.S., the South American country's defense policy is being constantly characterized as a destabilizing factor in the region.

Historically, relations between Colombia and Venezuela have gone through recurrent periods of tension; an example of this was both countries almost went to war in 1987, the Jaime Lusinchi government claimed that a Colombian warship had, without permission, penetrated Venezuelan territorial waters.

Such tensions have been further exacerbated during the Chávez-era after at least, on one occasion, the Venezuelan leader declared himself to be sympathetic to the cause of Colombia's leftist guerrillas, while Bogotá accused Venezuela of being used as an R+R facility for them.

The major de-stabilizing effect between Bogotá-Caracas relations could very well be, a result of the construction of the Kalishnikov factory in Venezuela. Colombia and Washington are bound to be apprehensive that some of the rifles that will be produced in this new installation may ultimately find their way to the Colombian rebel groups like FARC and ELN.

Interestingly, in spite of critics pointing to an arms' buildup among the region's militaries, this has not been the case so far. Aside from the short-lived, non-declared spats between Peru and Ecuador in 1995, there have been no major inter-state flare ups in the region. Some experts have even minimized the legitimacy of any U.S. concern over Venezuela's weapons purchases, dismissing it as simply a normal transaction which lacks any provocative connotations.

Retired general Alberto Miller told Inter Press Service in a 2005 interview that "it would be ridiculous for the world's major powers, which routinely spend huge sums on defense, to classify as an ‘arms race' the purchase of 100,000 rifles or 40 helicopters for a country that, like Venezuela, [that] has a difficult border of over 2,200 kms to guard on its western frontier alone."

Cash to the Kremlin

Mounting weapon sales to the region in recent years have increased Moscow's foreign currency earnings. In a March 1997 interview published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Boris Kuzyka, Assistant to the Russian President on Military-Technical Co-operation with Foreign Countries, explained that hard-currency returns from military-technical co-operation have doubled: from $1.7 billion in 1994 to $3.4 billion in 1996.

The Russian official went on to mention that the regions most promising for Russian Arms exports were the Middle East, South East Asia and Latin America.

The continuous export to regions like those Kuzyka mentioned helped Russia tie the U.S. as the world's top arms exporter between 2001 and 2005, harnessing around 30 percent of the global market, according to a report by SIPRI's Arms Transfer database.

President Putin has declared, according to Agence France Presse (AFP), that Russia had sold arms to 61 countries around the world in 2005, resulting in six billion dollars in signed contracts that year – a post-Soviet record. AFP also cites Pavel Felgenhauer, a Russian defense expert, saying that while Russia had become the biggest arms exporter in the world in terms of volume, it still lagged behind the United States in terms of the "actual money" earned and the total value of contracts signed but for later delivery.

Nonetheless, said Felgenhauer, "Russia is still far from returning to Soviet-era export levels, which were ten times higher." This point of view is shared by Vladimir Pakhomov, deputy director-general of Rosoboronexport has said that "At the moment, Russia's share in arms exports to Latin America is not sufficient."

The Venezuela arms deal, among others, is slowly but steadily bringing the volume of the Latin American arms trade to pre-1991 levels for Moscow. In fact, Russia already has surpassed the U.S. in arm sales to the Third World, with France coming in third.

According to a November 2006 CanWest News Service story by Steven Edwards, a U.S. Congressional report says Russia's US$ 7 billion in arms and ammunitions deals with developing countries accounted for almost 25 percent of the US$ 30 billion in its total 2005 contracts. France inked agreements to supply US$ 6.3 billion and the United States came in with US$ 6.18 billion, while China registered US$ 2.1 billion in such sales.

More information can be supplied by the Congressional Research Service's Report entitled: "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1998-2005" published last October. The report notes that Moscow exported $ 300 million worth of arms to Latin America between 1998-2001, and $ 600 million between 2002-2005. The likely exponentially growing Venezuelan arms procurements should vault past all such barriers on such sales.

It is very likely that the growing of Russian weapon sales to Latin America will continue over the coming years. President Putin has shown himself as a big supporter of these sales in order to expand Russian influence abroad.

As reported by the International Herald Tribune, Russian customs figures show Russian arms exports – of which Rosoboronexport controls 90 percent of the market – have grown by almost 70 percent since Putin established the agency in 2000.

In addition, nations like Cuba and Venezuela have few other sources for military equipment, due to their strained relations with the U.S., making Russia their natural weapon supplier, given that the U.S. has veto rights over the sale of any weaponry containing U.S. components.

Prophecies that Come True

In April 2005, Aleksandr Fomin, the deputy director of the Russian Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation, declared: "There are good prospects for boosting our military-technical cooperation with Latin American states […] We can offer Latin American states not just arms and military equipment, but also military technologies, cooperation in developing and manufacturing arms and licenses to produce Russian equipment."

Fomin was speaking almost prophetically, as Russia's presence in the arms trade, particularly as it regards Latin America, which has boomed ever since.

This analysis was prepared by COHA Research Fellow Alex Sánchez. The Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) – www.coha.org – is a think tank established in 1975 to discuss and promote inter-American relationship. Email: coha@coha.org.

The survey was conducted in 2003, and interviewed 9,744 students and 1,678 adults in six large cities (Belém, Salvador, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Porto Alegre and Brasí­lia).

As guns are used to settle disputes at school, it is not all that surprising to find that a gun may be carried by a boy or a girl.

What is surprising is that over 30% of the students, and 29% of the adults, interviewed said they had seen a firearm at school. A small percentage of the students (less than 5%) admitted to carrying a weapon (firearm or knife) to school at one time or another.

All of them said they carried a weapon to protect themselves and had no intention of attacking anyone or committing a crime.

The survey was conducted in public schools in urban areas with more than 500 students. According to Miriam Abramovay, a sociologist, such schools usually have a lack of human and material resources, high levels of failure and repetition, litlte upkeep and greater variation in student family income and background. She says private schools are more homogeneous and were not surveyed.

Agência Brasil

For the last eleven days since the robbery, Army troops have invaded and scoured slums in Rio looking for the weapons. Their presence in the slums caused a number of skirmishes with drug traffickers resulting in firefights and explosions. There were civilian casualties.

On March 3, a gang of bandits overpowered sentinels at an Army unit in Rio de Janeiro and robbed ten rifles and a pistol. The Army response was unexpected and unexpectedly severe.

For eleven consecutive days and nights, troops invaded and scoured slum areas in the city ostensibly searching for the stolen weapons, but also disrupting the lives of slum dwellers and the business of criminal elements (mainly drug dealers).

Some reports say that as much as 70% of drug trafficking activities ground to a halt because of the presence of the Army.

According to vice president and minister of Defense, José Alencar, if the government of Rio de Janeiro requests Army assistance in combating crime it could receive that assistance.

"The Army does not run, the Army does not retreat," he said, explaining that if there is a formal request, which is necessary, the city could get help from the military.

Alencar said that the presence of the Army troops on the city streets and in the slums over the past few days had been "beneficial," lowering crime rates. He pointed out that the Army had operated legally, with search and arrest warrants.

"Sometimes we are maybe a little too comprehensive about crime. We comprehend and crime grows. Perhaps we need more direct action like putting Army troops on the streets to show that crime does not pay," said the vice president.

Alencar said he had informed president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva that the Army had recovered its stolen weapons. "The President said he was satisfied and praised the action by the Army," said Alencar.

Agência Brasil

This assurance came Thursday, February 23, from the Argentinean ambassador, Juan Pablo Lohlé, after a meeting with the president of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, Aldo Rebelo (PCdoB party, São Paulo).

Lohlé informed that Argentina possesses internal security mechanisms and a good relationship with neighboring countries to combat arms trafficking and other kinds of crime. "Our commitment is to clear this situation up," he affirmed.

According to the ambassador, the Argentinean representative on the multilateral commission coordinated by the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations to look into the charges made by members of the Parliamentary Investigatory Commission (CPI) on Arms Trafficking will be a member of the Security Department of his country’s Ministry of the Interior. The first meeting of the commission is expected to take place soon after Carnaval, which ends March 1st.

At his meeting with the president of the Chamber, Lohlé discussed the gathering of representatives of Mercosur parliaments scheduled for March 25-27, in Buenos Aires.

"The idea of a Commission of Representatives of Mercosur Parliaments is to commemorate a Mercosur social event, because the Mercosur is not only a matter of trade but of political and social relations as well," the ambassador remarked. He said that Rebelo promised to attend the event.

Agência Brasil