The Commission accuses the military of being omissive in recognizing state liability for human rights violations committed in the period.

In a request for clarification to the Ministry of Defense, the CNV asked the Armed Forces to confirm or deny information that state agents tortured anti-dictatorship activists on military premises, often with higher officers knowing it.

In a statement, the commission said that the findings in the Armed Forces report received in June this year failed to taken into account the testimony and records obtained by the CNV as evidence that the military premises were misused.

According to the commission, there were no mentions of torture in the military reports, although even the Brazilian State has already admitted the violations.

Through its press office, the Defense Ministry said it has not received the request so it declined to comment. CNV coordinator Pedro Dallari again criticized “the unwillingness of military commanders to cooperate with the commission.”

ABr

That year, president Ernesto Geisel dismissed the then Army Minister Sylvio Frota , in a ruthless and reckless act to curb the regime’s hard-line radicalism – which in three months killed under torture, journalist Vladimir Herzog and worker Manoel Filho at the Second Army’s DOI-CODI (Destacamento de Operações de Informações – Centro de Operações de Defesa Interna – Department of Operations of Information – Center for Internal Defense Operations)  in São Paulo.

This time the opposite is happening. The military commanders are the ones trying to corner the president threatening mass resignation to oppose the presidential decree establishing a National Commission for Truth to investigate human rights violations and torture cases during the military dictatorship (1964-1985).

 Only washed wounds will heal. (Michelle Bachelet, a doctor, tortured in 1975, president of Chile in 2006)

For two decades, a repressive apparatus estimated at 24,000 agents arrested for political reasons about 50,000 Brazilians and tortured somewhere around 20,000 people – three each day.

The military had already reacted badly in August 2007 when the Presidential Palace released the book Right to Memory and Truth, a courageous job of 11 years from the Department of Human Rights, started during the Cardoso administration, acknowledging for the first time the government’s responsibility for the official violence, with a list of 339 dead or missing due to political repression. In a clear act of defiance, no military commander attended the ceremony presided over by the commander in chief of the Armed Forces, President Lula.

Cemetery Peace

The barracks’ bitterness, then and now, was already expected. But what surprised, in fact, was the heavy bombing that the National Plan for Human Rights drew from the national public opinion’s traditionally more enlightened groups. Editorials in the mainstream press, renowned writers and influential bloggers closed ranks against the idea of the Truth Commission, voicing unqualified fear blown, in a tone of veiled threat, by the barracks and the usual vivandières (women attached to military regiments as sutlers or canteen keepers).

The alarmist situation outlined by a block reaction showed a worrisome future: a Brazil again conflicted, divided, steeped in revenge, trying to settle past accounts with a calculated review of the Amnesty Act of 1979, manipulated by ex-terrorists now entrenched in government looking for a personal vendetta against those responsible for abuse suffered in prison.

Streets signs and schools named after torturers would be wiped off the national map and federal police agents would invade military barracks in search of clandestine graves of people killed by the repression. All this plotting against the peace covenant established three decades ago to enshrine the tolerant and peaceful Brazil that would rather forgive and forget. Really?

The excited national media let go unnoticed something far more serious: the triple functional transgression by the president, the minister and the military chiefs. Lula by omission: more concerned about the thawing of the planet in Copenhagen than with the heating of the barracks in Brasilia, he acknowledged he had not read the law he signed – a written version of the traditional “I didn’t know.”

Nelson Jobim as a bungler: despite having a big 6.2 feet body he has not grown enough to understand the institutional role of his position as Defense minister, someone who must exercise the authority of the civilian society over the armed forces, and not the other way around.

The commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force for insubordination: they opposed a government decision announced in a public forum by their commander in chief, to whom they owe unrestricted obedience as imposed by the constitution.

They bumped head-on with the facts and with government colleagues. The Secretary of Human Rights, Paulo Vanucchi, central focus of the military wrath, explained: “The PNDH is not against the Amnesty. It doesn’t annul or revise the law. The bill says that the Truth Commission will be set ‘as defined by the Law Amnesty ‘. It’s there in the text. You just have to read,” says Vanucchi.

His boss and main ally, Justice Minister Tarso Genro argues: “During the military regime no provision, not even the AI-5, allowed torture. This is not a political offense but a common one.” This is the essence of the difference that justifies the action of Brazil’s Bar Association (OAB) in the Federal Supreme Court (STF) to define the amnesty’s scope. “Brazil cannot cower and cannot want to hide the truth.” Amnesty is not amnesia,” teaches Cezar Britto, president of the OAB.

Jurist Paul Brossard disagrees: “The effects of the amnesty have been felt when the law came into force. The crime itself is deleted.” The former minister of the STF, which was a brave MDB senator in the bloody 1970s, was not always so legalistic. “I never wanted [the coup] in 1964, but I thought it was absolutely normal, because it was just self-defense of a society then directly threatened,” he admits in his memoir, Brossard – 80 years in the Political History of Brazil (Arts & Crafts, 2004, p. 126).

In an article published in daily Zero Hora last week, Brossard explains why he considers the amnesty irreversible: “Amnesty may be more or less unfair, but it is not justice its outstanding character. It’s peace.”

Whose peace, paleface? It is certainly not cemetery’s peace from those killed by torture, nor peace of mind of the relatives of the political disappeared, let alone peace of conscience of those who survived the torture and screams of pain in the dungeons.

“State Responsibility”

The amnesty law that Brossard holds dear is not the result of consensus of a country sitting around the table of understanding. It is more the delivery of the dictatorship’s rings to not lose the fingers stained with blood. Pressed by the growing clamor of the streets in 1979, General João Figueiredo negotiated, top to bottom, the amnesty that seemed more appropriate to the regime.

The Left, defeated in the armed struggle, arrested or exiled, didn’t have much to demand, but the benevolence of the military regime, which would still last six more years. It swallowed an amnesty grafted in the barracks with a broad and vague shield, diluted in the expression “related crimes,” which should cover the torturers’ crimes of blood.

One of the ministers of Figueiredo who signs the law on August 29 of that year, is General Octávio Aguiar de Medeiros, head of the SNI (National Information Service), who still dreamed of the regime’s survival and his own anointing as the sixth president of the dictatorship. The terrorism left in the country in those days was all from the Right, which set fire to newsstands and exploded bombs in organizations that called for democracy, as the OAB’s national headquarters.

On the eve of Labor Day in 1981, two years after the promulgation of the amnesty, a Puma car exploded prematurely in Riocentro. It had on board two Army’s terrorist operatives: one sergeant who died with the bomb on his lap and a DOI-CODI captain who survived unharmed and became a professor at the Military Academy in Brasília.

A police-military investigation by the Army found that the attack was planned by the SNI’s head in Rio, Colonel Freddie Perdigão. Other victims of that clumsy ‘work accident’ fell by the wayside: the Medeiros’s presidential project, Figueiredo’s infarcted heart and chances to extend the dictatorship.

Figueiredo and the dictatorship left the Presidential Palace through the back door in 1985, so as not to return the presidential sash usurped from the civilian power in 1964. The new president, José Sarney, signed in 1989 Brazil’s adherence to the international treaty that considers torture a crime against humanity and as such, indefeasible. Nevertheless, no one went through the unpleasantness of a conviction, which is now common in other Southern Cone countries

The only exception is Colonel Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra sentenced in first instance in São Paulo in a process that seeks only to declare him a “torturer”. He doesn’t lack merits: as major, he built and headed the regime’s most famous center of repression and torture, the DOI-CODI at Tutóia street, in São Paulo. In 40 months as commander of that corruption cave, according to a Commission for Justice and Peace of the Archdiocese of São Paulo, Ustra racked up 502 complaints of torture (one every 60 hours) and 40 deaths (one a month).

In defense before the Court, the brave Ustra preferred to kick the responsibility up the ladder:

“The Brazilian army is a legal entity, and so illegal acts, including acts that cause moral damage, done by agents of these entities are answered by these legal entities and not the agent against whom they have regressive right. ( …) Every time a Brazilian army officer acts in the exercise of his functions he will be drawing the State’s responsibility.” 

Manly Brazil

Tutóia street and Colonel Ustra remind us of an even greater tragedy: the Second World War (1939-1945). The planet’s greatest catastrophe involved 100 million soldiers from 72 nations on five continents, killing 70 million people (the combined populations of Argentina and Canada) and mutilating nearly 30 million. It cost about US$ 1.5 trillion, almost as much as Barack Obama has injected into the economy to save banks and carmakers.

The victorious powers have seen fit to punish the direct responsible for all this, the Third Reich of Hitler. Soviet leader Josef Stalin had a blunt solution: kill all the Nazis directly or indirectly involved with the war. According to the allies’ calculations, that would mean over 100,000 executions of agents from Hitler’s state apparatus – three times more than the dead at Dachau, the first Nazi concentration camp on the outskirts of Munich.

The more civilized solution won: the Nuremberg Tribunal, who spent 285 days of trial to hear 240 witnesses and write down 300,000 statements, generating a summary of 4 billion words. The final indictment of 25,000 pages to the main Nazi leaders sentenced 12 to death, three to life imprisonment and another three to prison terms between 10 and 20 years. Three were acquitted.

The defense claimed at Nuremberg the same point raised in São Paulo: the “due obedience to superior orders.” What American judge Francis Biddle replied serves, therefore, also to Colonel Ustra: “Individuals have international duties to perform, beyond national duties that a particular state may impose,” said Biddle.

Nuremberg sank forever in the conscience of the civilized world, the pioneering notion that the foundations of the human person are above the political circumstances and beyond national borders. That is why the long arm of the Spanish judge Baltazar Garzón reached Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet in London, for crimes of torture and murder. The Third Reich’s defense tried to raise a principle that would prevent the trial of past events (ex post facto), arguing that there was no provision in the law prior to the crimes on trial.

Prevailed fact and common sense that no law in the world had imagined, as state policy, such a large scale of genocide as the one coldly devised by the Nazi ingenuity in their concentration camps where six million Jews were killed. If Ustra’s argument were accepted in Nuremberg, to escape prison it would be enough to say that all Nazis were just following Adolf Hitler’s orders … The argument didn’t work there, but seems to have good results here. Nobody is even indicted in Brazil, and when that happens, Colonel Ustra says that the excesses that he possibly committed were the State’s responsibility.

Minister Tarso Genro and the country’s most renowned scholars remind us that even the harshest exception acts were careful never to mention, much less authorize torture. It is a crime, therefore, without father or mother. Amnesty is not forgetfulness, is forgiveness, teach jurists who do not hide behind words. We cannot forget what we don’t know. Nor can we forgive what has not been punished – immaculate privilege of all torturers who still exist in the country. American historian Edward Peters, professor at the University of Pennsylvania, warned: “The future of torture is inextricably linked to the torturers’ future.”

That is, the impunity of the torturer just ensures the perpetuity of torture and its beloved daughter, violence. The Brazil that avoids punishing or even pointing its torturers ends up banalizing violence, which spills over the dictatorship and victimizes ordinary citizens in full democracy, especially in the two largest capitals, São Paulo and Rio.

In the 24 years following the amnesty (1979-2003), firearms killed 550,000 people in Brazil – 44% of them youths aged 15 to 24 years. This manly, peaceful and friendly Brazil, lost nearly as many people as the United States during the five years it fought in World War II (625,000 troops). In a single year, 2003, according to the Ministry of Health, it was murdered in Brazil a civilian population (51,000 thousand people) almost as large as the United States losses (58 thousand) over the Vietnam War’s 16 years.

Last Dictator

It is hard to tell how much of this violence has a direct line to the torture of the dictatorship that remained unpunished as well as its perpetrators. But, of course, who kills and tortures today has the good example of their predecessors who remain unscathed and protected. It is even harder to explain the feeling of solidarity that makes Brazil’s current military commanders into loyal fellows of old criminals of a military coup that’s now celebrating 46 years.

No friendship can exist between military generations as distinct, so far from illegality. Captains, majors and lieutenant colonels today, in the three forces, were not even born when the military raided the cellars of 1970’s to run the state terrorism that fiercely fought the armed Left. The best example is the job record of Brazil’s Armed Forces current leaders, all professionally matured in the democratic regime, which now reaches 25 years of life.

Army commander, General Enzo Martins Peri, is from a technical branch of the ground-force, Engineering. He was second lieutenant at age 23, when the 1964 coup occurred. Between the eve of the military rebellion and the restless 1968, Peri hibernated in a bureaucratic engineering battalion in Rio de Janeiro. He passed briefly through the 2nd section (information area) of the discrete 1st Engineering and Construction Group of João Pessoa (Paraíba state), during Ernesto Geisel’s government. He crossed the turbulent 1970s as major. Just got promoted to general in 1995, during the Cardoso government, without ever having soiled his hands with repression.

Navy commander, Admiral Júlio Soares de Moura Neto, was still very young when the coup of 64 happened, eleven days after his 21st birthday. It was nearly five months after the fall of João Goulart  that Moura Neto wore the uniform, as midshipman. In the 1970’s lead years, he kept white not only his political records but also his corvette captain’s uniform. He arrived at the Admiralty during the Cardoso government in 1995.

Air Force commander, Juniti Saito, turned a FAB cadet at the end of 1965, 19 months after the military coup. He became captain in 1971 and ended the cursed decade as a major, without ever flying over the most radical area of the Air Force set ablaze by radical Brigadier John Paul Burnier. He was promoted to colonel in the Sarney administration, in 1988, and became brigadier with Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1995.

In the job record of the three, therefore, there is no reason to justify the corporate response in defense of people who soiled the uniform with torture. A proper understanding of the historical process that requires knowledge of the past would do very well to the three chiefs of the Armed Forces who are committed to the country and the Constitution they vowed to defend – not with the radicals of the past who fear the sanitary effects of a Truth Commission.

There is therefore no reason for them to feel offended by something that is a moral obligation of a country that must confront its history to better know its fate. It is pure nonsense to imagine that a wave of revisionism will clog corners of the country with names of torturers or heads of the dictatorship.

General Garrastazu Médici, the popular president of the bloodiest phase of the military regime (1969-74), when Colonel Ustra used to shine at Tutóia street, is a city name in Rondônia and Maranhão, an avenue in Osasco (São Paulo), a neighborhood in Chapecó (Santa Catarina), a street in São Luís (Maranhão), a residential complex in Rio (Rio de Janeiro).

Senator Filinto Muller, the head of the truculent political police of the Getúlio Vargas dictatorship and who sent in 1936 Jewish German Olga Benário (the pregnant wife of communist Luis Carlos Prestes) to death in a Hitler’s concentration camp, is all over the country: he’s the name of seven schools in three states, he baptizes three streets and one avenue. Muller also has the right to a bust in the Senate’s ward office that bears his name. It is useless to imagine that an alleged revenge would attempt to repeal now these addresses and tributes.

Instead of cowering with ghosts of a past we should know and not fear, Minister Jobim and the military leaders should be inspired by the courageous example of Argentina, which has a case of violence and death much bloodier than Brazil. There, without fear of revenge, the government of Néstor Kirchner (2003-07) reversed, with the support of the Supreme Court, the two indulgent amnesty laws – the Full Stop and Due Obedience – granted by President Raúl Alfonsín (1983-89) .

The Argentine judiciary now is suing 263 military and police agents for crimes against human rights. The general responsible for the 1976 coup, Jorge Rafael Videla, 85, was sentenced to life in prison and is under house arrest, as well as the last president of the dictatorship, General Reynaldo Bignone.

In Uruguay, the last dictator, General Gregório Alvarez, was sentenced in 2009 to 25 years in prison for killing 37 opponents – three fewer than the number of victims of the Tutóia street’s DOI-CODI under the command of Colonel Ustra.

Without Fear, Without Guilt

Lula, Jobim and the military ministers might draw inspiration from the noble figure of Martin António Balza, a soft-spoken general of proud bearing, who commanded the Argentina Army from 1991 to 1999, during the two terms of President Carlos Menem.

He came from Artillery specializing in mountain warfare. As lieutenant colonel, he took part in the 1982 Falklands War commanding an artillery battalion. He was arrested by the British and for the bravery the Buenos Aires generals didn’t show he received the Army’s Medal of Merit.

His most notable act, however, was the amazing appearance he made the night of April 25, 1995 in Tiempo Nuevo, Argentina TV’s most important talk show, presented by journalist Bernardo Neustadt. With the commander’s khaki uniform and his white hair at 61, Balza started an unexpected mea culpa that touched the country still traumatized by the officially recognized 18,000 disappearances (30,000 according to human rights organizations) in the “dirty war” years between 1976 and 1983.

He took a paper from his pocket and with a firm voice, full of conviction, read a text that could be a general’s reading about  Brazil. Balza talks:

“I want to start a painful dialogue about the past, a painful dialogue that was never maintained and that moves like a ghost on the collective consciousness, returning these days inevitably from the shadows where it occasionally hides. Our country lived the 70’s, a decade marked by violence, messianism and ideology. Without looking for innovative words, but by appealing to the old military regulations, I take this opportunity to once again order the army, before the whole society: no one is obliged to comply with an immoral order or that departs from the laws and military regulations. Who does it incurs a vicious conduct, worthy of the punishment its gravity requires. Without euphemisms I say clearly:

“Commits an offense whoever violates the national Constitution. Commits an offense whoever gives immoral orders. Commits an offense whoever obey immoral orders. Commits an offense he who, to fulfill an end he believes just, uses unjust and immoral means. An understanding of these essential aspects makes the republican life of a state. Understanding this, abandoning once and for all the apocalyptic vision, pride, accepting dissent and respecting the sovereign will …

“This is the first step we are taking in many years to leave the past behind, to help build the Argentina of the future, an Argentina matured in pain that can come someday to a fraternal embrace. If we cannot elaborate the pain and heal the wounds, we’ll have no future. We must no longer deny the horror we experienced, so that we can think of our lives as a society that advances, overcoming pain and suffering.

“In the name of the fight against subversion, the military overthrew the constitutional government and installed himself in power illegitimately through a coup d’état. I come to ask forgiveness for this and take the political responsibility for the folly committed in the past. In power, the Army committed still other crimes. The Army arrested, kidnapped, tortured and murdered – as the subversive offenders did – and many of its members became like them criminals.

Argentina, astounded and moved, swallowed hard. It was the first time that a general said, with clarity and bluntness, what the country commented to itself in a painful and still startled whisper. The act of contrition liberated and encouraged the other two military leaders.

Days later, the commander of the Air Force admitted the same excesses, followed by the Navy commander, a patron of most emblematic sign of repression in the country – the ESMA, the Navy Mechanics School.

In 2004, the classical style building framed with four slender columns of white marble, in the elegant Avenida Libertador in Buenos Aires, was renovated and transformed into the “Space for the Memory and the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights.” It is open to the public since 2007. Last December, capping this phase of national dignity, started the trial of 19 Navy personnel accused of crimes against humanity committed inside the ESMA.

The historical testimony of General Martín Balza produced a profound effect on the country and the Argentine armed forces, reminisces Brazilian journalist Flávio Tavares, who was a correspondent for O Estado de S. Paulo in Buenos Aires in the lead years:

“Without the knowledge of President Carlos Menem himself, General Balza did the mea culpa and began the process of sinceramiento as Argentina calls this military institution’s catharsis. Thus, he released thousands of Armed Forces’ military officers from the nightmare of having to assume as their own crimes committed by a minority in the Army, Navy and Air Force.

“This sinceramiento process, the decision to hide nothing, reconnected the armed forces to the population, overcoming suspicions and fears. I still remember that after Balza’s repentance interview, an Argentine journalist – with family members murdered by the dictatorship – came up smiling, stretched out her hand and said:

– For the first time I can shake hands with a general without fear or guilt. “

A dialogue so painful in a nation so bruised as Argentina, shows that the amnesty and pardon issue depends, sometimes on the right word and a lot of political will. Moreover it calls for courage, which so far has not emerged in Brazil’s High Command. It’s not hard to imagine the regenerating effect that a statement by general Enzo Peri, with this kind of content, would have in Brazilian history, reconciling military and their victims by the mere admission of guilt. It is a painful. resigned, contrite gesture, but of unsurpassed grandeur. It is hard and at the same time simple. Therefore, possible.

When he took the post of Defense minister, at a time when the country was living with the air blackout that crippled airports, Nelson Jobim made a rallying call that impressed by the courage, the determination:

– Act or get out, do or go away!

Brazil would like to shake the hand of its generals, without fear or guilt.

Just take action and do, Minister Jobim! Otherwise, leave. Go away.

Luiz Cláudio Cunha is a journalist, author of Operation Condor: The Kidnapping of Uruguayans (LP & M Publishing, 2008). This text originally appeared in Portuguese in Observatório da Imprensa.

According to the leading dailies O Globo and O Estado de S. Paulo the resignations were presented on December 22, a day after Lula unveiled the “truth commission” bill, but were rejected. The Brazilian leader promised Jobim – a distinguished jurist – to review the text before sending it to congressional debate.

The creation of the National Commission on the Truth is part of Brazil’s Human Rights National Program launched by Lula to help identify those responsible for the alleged torturing of 20.000 people and the killing of 400 political opponents during the 21-year military dictatorship.

The text of the bill was drafted by Human Rights minister Paulo Vannuchi who said the purpose was “to rescue information of all that happened during the long period of dictatorial repression in recent Brazilian history.”

Vannuchi said there is a possibility of taking to court those responsible for human rights abuses if the Supreme Federal Tribunal accepts the Lula administration argument that those responsible for this kind of crimes are not protected under the Amnesty law dating back to 1979, approved under the last president of the military regime, General João Figueiredo.

For this reason the proposal includes a reference to the possibility of annulling “legislation remnant from the 1964/1985 period which is contrary to human rights guarantees.”

But in spite of long extenuating and sometimes tense negotiations with the military, the final text triggered indignation and was catalogued as “revengeful” since it did not include in the investigations members of the left wing armed groups that also committed human rights abuses against members of the regime.

“If they want to see generals and colonels in the dock, let’s also include Dilma (Rousseff) and Franklin Martins,” said a retired general quoted by O Estado. Martins is head of the presidential press office and Ms Rousseff cabinet chief and Lula da Silva’s chosen hopeful to succeed him as presidential candidate for October’s election. Both of them belonged to left wing armed groups under the military dictatorship.

According to O Estado de S. Paulo, on not accepting the resignations of Minister Jobim and the commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force, Lula da Silva promised a “political” solution to the dispute and asked the Defense minister to ensure the military that his administration would not be the “spokesperson of measures that revoke the Amnesty Law of 1979.”

Apparently Lula’s promise helped to cool tempers but did not dissipate the disappointment among the top brass. “That’s how Lula acts: he pushes the issue and kicks the crisis forward but we never manage to be freed from this menacing atmosphere,” said a brigadier quoted by the press.

The presidential office, the Planalto, did not comment the reports of a possible military crisis but minister Vannuchi admitted “discrepancies” with his Defense peer. However he said he ignored about the resignations requests.

“I was with President Lula on December 23 and he mentioned no word about the issue,” said Vannuchi who added that there’s “no atmosphere” for a collective resignation of the Armed Forces commanders: “It like talking about thunder in a clear sunny day; it sounds as a storm in a glass of water.”

Groups representing those killed or missing are also dissatisfied and concerned the commission may be used to draw a line under the past rather than open the way for trials of former soldiers, as have occurred in neighboring Argentina, Uruguay and Chile.

They noted that a draft version of the proposal had called the new body, which has to be approved by the Brazilian Congress, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission rather than a Truth and Justice Commission.

Brazil has never convicted anyone for participating in dictatorship-era murders and torture and has refused to make public the military’s archives from the period.

The victims’ groups insist the truth commission must have the power to investigate crimes, including the hiding or destroying of archives, to recommend criminal cases against suspects, and to send documents to courts.

Mercopress

"I don't believe we can see a signal or a hypothesis of an arms race in South America, each country needs a minimum of security and a minimum system of defense to safeguard its borders," said Lula.

Brazil needs to refurbish its military equipment and update our industry, "that is why all our hardware incorporation involves technology transfer," he added pointing out that the country needs all the investment in defense to protect "our long coastline, our hydrocarbons reserves and to combat the drugs threats along our territorial borders."

He underlined that for Brazil the latest deals are "an investment in defense and technology."

Lula also said that Chile and Colombia have the "best organized Armed Forces of the continent."

These two countries have invested heavily in new weapons and equipment lately. Chile had taken advantage of the copper windfall earnings, of which a percentage is legally earmarked for military hardware.

Colombia has the support and aid from the United States. The Plan Colombia involves several billion US dollars to help combat terrorist groups and organized drugs cartels. Colombian forces have been fighting the rebels for decades but in the last ten years, particularly under President Alvaro Uribe the tide has decisively turned towards the government and its intelligence gathering system plus crack ground forces with air fast support.

Finally he supported Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez spending in military hardware.

"Venezuela is a country with huge reserves of oil and gas, and President Chavez was the victim of a coup to oust him, so it's only normal he prepares for such situations." According to the latest reports Brazil has agreed with France the purchase of five submarines, one of them nuclear powered; 36 fighter bomber, possibly Rafale, and 50 Cougar helicopters.

Colombia: 24 Israeli manufactured K-Fir fighter bombers; armored vehicles; 15 Black Hawk choppers; 60 speed boats and 20 howitzer 105 mm; Chile, 28 F-16, 2 Scorpene submarines, 8 frigates Type 23, 118 Leopard 2 tanks and 139 armored vehicles YPR 765.

Finally Venezuela has acquired 24 Shukov 30 fighter bombers, a missiles system, 92 tanks T 72, 50 helicopters MI and 100.000 AK 103 rifles.

Mercopress

Through a press statement, the Brazilian navy said that the agreement forecasts the transfer of technology necessary not just for the military designers, but also for the several companies that are going to participate in the construction of conventional submarines and of the first Brazilian nuclear submarine.

According to the Brazilian Navy, many national products should be used in the submarines. "Up to now, there are already over 30 national companies involved, which should contribute with over 36,000 items, including complex systems," according to the press statement.

Apart from that, a shipyard will be built in Itaguaí­, in the metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro, to build the nuclear submarine. The site should also serve for the production of conventional submarines and should include a naval base for support of these vessels. According to the government of Rio de Janeiro, the works should be developed by Odebrecht and by Sepetiba Consortium.

Still according to the Brazilian Navy, the entire production process of the submarines and of the shipyards should generate over 2,000 direct jobs and around 6,000 indirect ones.

The agreement for cooperation defines that the French help should be limited, in the long run, to the design and to the non-nuclear part of the first Brazilian nuclear submarine. According to the document, the vessel should use conventional weapons and both the nuclear reactor and the electronic systems associated to it should be developed by Brazil.

Although exempting itself from any responsibility with regard to damaged caused to third parties by the submarine or by its land support installations, the agreement forecasts the establishment of companies or consortia of private rights established by public, private or mixed-capital companies, Brazilian or French, to develop and build a submarine capable of receiving a nuclear reactor, produced according to international safety procedures.

The government of France agreed to authorize the sale, by French companies, of equipment, material and services to the Brazilian Navy or to Brazilian companies. Apart from that, the two countries should also consider the possibility of, totally or partially, exempting goods and services imported or produced for these purposes from direct or indirect taxes.

ABr

The announcement of the IV Fleet setting sail does not represent any major change in U.S. military activity, but it does reveal how the U.S. government’s approach to Latin America can be an element of division in the hemisphere.

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead announced on April 24 the re-deployment of the IV Fleet.(1) He said that “[r]e-establishing the Fourth Fleet recognizes the immense importance of maritime security in the southern part of the Western Hemisphere, and signals our support and interest in the civil and military maritime services in Central and South America.”

Effective July 1, the new command structure will have operational responsibility for U.S. Navy ships that operate in the SouthCom area  – one of the six regions of the world that the Pentagon divides into unified commands.

Spokespersons for the U.S. Navy affirm that the announcement of the IV Fleet’s redeployment does not imply new military assets to the region. “There has been some misperception that with the re-establishment of U.S. Fourth Fleet comes more ships to the region. In Navy culture the word ‘fleet’ can mean two things – a ‘physical’ fleet of ships or an ‘organization’ staffed to fulfill a planning and coordination mission. U.S. Fourth Fleet will be an organizational fleet,” clarified Lieutenant Joe “Myers” Vasquez, U.S. Navy Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (SouthCom).(2)

The new organizational structure thus implies an additional duty for U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command headquartered in Mayport, Florida. The IV Fleet will concentrate efforts on the fight against illicit trafficking and providing humanitarian aid and disaster relief, officials say.

But leaders from South America are not convinced. They point to the poor response of the U.S. government when Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans as reason to question the official explanation. “The United States must have some information above and beyond what we know, which made them make this decision,” said Venezuelan Rear Admiral César Augusto Manzano.(3)

The June headline for Le Monde Diplomatique’s Brazil edition states “The Empire Strikes Back: Worried about the leftward drift of Latin American governments and the discovery of formidable oil reserves and abundance of natural resources, the United States restarts its IV Fleet.”(4)

While Le Monde’s headlines may appear as fear-mongering since no new military forces have been earmarked for deployment, it does call attention to suspicions that increased U.S. military presence aims at economic control over natural resources and political control to rein in South American efforts to chart a course less oriented to the United States. The Union of South American Nations (Unión de las Naciones del Sur – UNASUR) symbolizes this latest attempt.

U.S. Hegemony on the Wane

South America’s relationship with the rest of the world has changed substantially in recent years. While the United States has been preoccupied with the War on Terrorism and focusing its attention mainly in the Middle East, South America has increased its trade relations with the rising economies of Asia.

The Council on Foreign Relations recently released a report saying the United States is losing hegemony in the region and new direction is needed.(5) The Council’s Task Force on Latin America bluntly states this new reality: “If there was an era of U.S. hegemony in Latin America, it is over.”

But in the same breath, the authors of the report say that as a region Latin America has “never mattered more” to the United States, since it is the largest supplier of oil, one of the fasting growing trading partners, and largest source of immigrants. The Task Force concludes with recommendations, stressing that the United States should focus on common areas of concern – poverty and inequality, public security, migration, and energy security – and recognize that Latin America’s fate is largely in Latin America’s hands.”

The latest move toward building continental unity was announced on May 23. The presidents of 12 South American nations gathered in Brasília, the capital of Brazil, to sign on to UNASUR. This follows up on efforts begun in December 2004 when the region’s countries pledged to create the South American Community of Nations.

The latest gathering may seem like yet another attempt at unifying under a new name, alongside Mercosur, Andean Community, and Pacific Arc, to name a few. However, the new institution will be recognized as a formal international organization and will create a stronger forum to work toward integration among the 12 countries of South America, home to 360 million people and a gross domestic product (GDP) of US$ 2.5 trillion (in 2006 dollars).

UNASUR pledges to work on developing a common customs union, currency, and passport. As outlined in previous agreements, the Union plans to establish executive headquarters in Ecuador, a South American parliament in Bolivia, and the Bank of the South in Venezuela.

The twist on this effort is Brazil’s proposal to create a South American Defense Council comprised of the region’s ministers of defense. Celso Amorim, Brazil’s minister of foreign affairs, said that the purpose of the council is to provide a “space for dialogue between the militaries of the countries of the region in order to formulate policies and prevent conflicts.”

Centrifugal Forces

The initial steps of the organization demonstrate the challenges ahead. The first two candidates for the rotating secretary-general of UNASUR turned down the offer before Chile’s President Michelle Bachelet accepted the post.

The position was first offered to Colombia’s President Alvaro Uribe who refused because no other member of the union would recognize the National Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-FARC) as a “terrorist group.” The other regional leaders follow the United Nations’ denomination of the group as a “belligerent force.”

Ecuador’s ex-President Rodrigo Borjas also turned down the secretary-general position because his proposal to accelerate the merger of Mercosur with the Andean Community fell on deaf ears. UNASUR was legally constituted despite its political problems concerning who would be the first leader.

The next bump in the road was Colombia’s differences with its neighbors. The recent intrusion of the Colombian military on Ecuador’s soil to attack a FARC encampment revealed both the need for such a forum and the difficulties of forming it.

An editorial in Colombia’s El Pais said that Uribe has resisted the idea of the Defense Council since it would provide another space for Hugo Chavez and his allies to take advantage of South American solidarity to denounce the United States and to create military bodies for political ends.(6)

To avoid ruptures at the outset of UNASUR, members decided to create a working group to analyze the creation of the Defense Council for 90 days. Both El Pais and Brazil’s business daily Valor Econômico consider the Defense Council another useless bureaucracy. But other news media considered its creation an increasing urgency: “If at the beginning the Defense Council seems little more than a forum, this is its most pressing necessity,” wrote Brazilian weekly Carta Capital.(7)

Border disputes continue to be the main source of conflict in the region. Not only did Ecuador (followed by its ally Venezuela) mobilize their forces after the Colombian incursion, but in 1995 Ecuador and Peru exchanged artillery over a border skirmish. Also, there are a number of internal conflicts, besides Colombia’s decades-long civil war, such as separatist movements in Bolivia and dissidence in Venezuela.

Nelson Jobim, Brazil’s Minister of Defense, who turned down U.S. offers to participate in the Defense Council, foresees its mission as coordinating disaster relief efforts and peacekeeping missions.

If the nations’ leaders finally are able to breathe life into the South American Defense Council and obtain the active participation of all the member countries, it could achieve two long-desired objectives. First, while South American unity remains far removed from the degree of institutionalization of its model entity – the European Union – at least the region will have achieved what the African Union has accomplished in policing its area. Second, instead of relying on the Organization of American States (OAS), seen as dominated by the United States, the continent’s leaders will have formal space to resolve internal conflicts and define a common agenda.

U.S. Strategic Posturing

South America’s growing political independence as a region raises the question: what is the United States’ role in the area? To answer, first it is necessary to define U.S. interests. According to Lieutenant Vasquez of SouthCom, “Thirty-eight percent of U.S. global trade is with countries in the Western Hemisphere and we import 34% of our oil from the region. Two-thirds of ships that transit the Panama Canal are bound for U.S. ports.”

SouthCom’s priorities also include counter-terrorism, counternarcotics, and engagement of the region’s militaries via joint training exercises. Secondary missions are arms control and non-proliferation, humanitarian and civic assistance, search and rescue, and disaster relief.(8)

In this scheme, re-activating the IV Fleet would seem to respond to objectives aimed at keeping sea lanes open for trade and closed to illicit trafficking. “The stature of a Fleet sends the right signal even to those that are not our greatest supporters,” Admiral Jim Stevenson told a Bloggers Roundtable.(9)

One scenario he depicted in which the IV Fleet could be called into action is if the Cuban people do not accept the leadership of Raul Castro’s leadership and decide to flee in mass – thus repeating the Mariel Boatlift of 1980. “If you don’t have the capability to rescue these people, you have a disaster on your hands. I don’t think anyone can sit around and watch hundreds and hundreds of thousands of people die at sea,” the Admiral said.

U.S. presence in South America continues to grate on the nerves of nationalists who fear that the United States’ primary interest is access to natural resources. The most important and recent relevant fact was Brazil’s announcement of large oil deposits discovered in the Tupi field off its southeast coast, estimated to produce 5-8 billion barrels.

Haroldo Lima, the head of the National Petroleum Agency (Agência Nacional do Petróleo), boasted that the country’s oil reserves could reach 33 billion barrels and possibly much more, a huge jump from proven reserves of 12 billion barrels as of last year.(10)

Minister of Defense Jobim said that the IV Fleet will not enter Brazilian waters without authorization: “Here they do not enter,” he told military authorities. But the question of how far Brazilian sovereignty extends still remains an open question. The Convention of Montego Bay establishes the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) at 200 nautical miles but could be extended to 300 if the continental shelf extends outward.

Both Brazil and the United States are signatories of the convention but the United States has yet to ratify it. Lima stoked nationalist fears when he said last May that the United States has repeatedly violated the EEZ. But U.S. Admiral James Stavridis countered that the U.S. Navy indeed does respect it.(11)

Despite fears from Brazilian nationalists, Brazil-U.S. relations have tightened lately, especially on issues of energy security. Brazil’s state-owned oil giant Petrobras continues to rely on a number of foreign sub-contractors, including Halliburton, but more important is the recent biofuels partnership between George W. Bush and Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

The agreement pledges to expand technical assistance to Central American and Caribbean countries to develop the use of ethanol. Also, Brazil has never pressured foreign investors to renegotiate contracts as have the governments of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador.

The IV Fleet is designed to improve the administrative and command structure of the U.S. Navy in SouthCom’s joint operations with other countries in the theater. The most important event is the Partnership of the Americas, a six-month naval deployment in the Caribbean, Central, and South America. The partnership includes a number of multinational exercises carried out by U.S. forces with the region’s militaries.

The biggest naval operation of the partnership is UNITAS Atlantic & Pacific, held since 1959, which includes two annual maritime scenario training exercises aimed at enhancing security cooperation and improving coalition operations. Other naval exercises include Teamwork South, Siforex, Community Relations, New Horizons, Counter-Drug Operations, Panamax, and Disaster Relief (see endnote 8).

U.S.: Unifier or Divider?

With so many different military exercises held in willing partnership with South American militaries, the restart of IV Fleet without any ships and equipment may seem like a minor development. Are those fearful of U.S. encroachments just crying wolf? But within SouthCom’s region, U.S. naval operations complement the ring of U.S. military bases.

These include Comapala, El Salvador; Manta, Ecuador; Guantánamo, Cuba; Atuba, Curacao; and Comayuga, Honduras. The U.S. forces have also undertaken training exercises at the Mariscal Estigarribia airport in Paraguay(12) although a recent look at the alleged U.S. base in Paraguay discovered a nearly deserted airstrip.(13)

The formally established bases in the region have been more active – the most polemical with regard to U.S.-Latin American relations is Manta. Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa refused to renew the base’s contract that expires in 2009, so the United States is discussing with Colombian authorities to move it to La Guajira, near the Venezuelan border (see endnote 4).

Moving the base to La Guajira would undoubtedly inflame tensions between Venezuela and Colombia and by extension, the United States. Uribe claims that Chavez supports the FARC, while the Venezuelan government characterizes Colombia as a puppet of the United States. In fact, the Latin American press considers Colombia’s attack on Ecuadorian soil to be based on information from U.S. intelligence services.

The Chavez government has reacted angrily to the U.S. bases surrounding Venezuela and U.S. generals listing “radical populism” a major new security threat.(14) One dangerous scenario (outright war would be worse) is an acceleration of the alleged arms race occurring in South America. Former Brazilian President José Sarney and other regional leaders warn about Venezuela increasing its military strength. “If [Venezuela] truly becomes a military power, an arms race in Latin America will ensue. It will lead to a strategic disequilibrium on the continent,” Senator Sarney cautioned.(15)

Based on percentage of GDP, however, Venezuela is the Andean country that spends the least on defense at 1.39%, with Ecuador in the top spot at 3.14%. But other sources claim that Venezuela is spending billions of dollars in recent years that are not included in the regular budget.
According to Military Power Review, which measures military power in terms of brute measures of military hardware, Brazil continues to occupy the top spot in all of South America, and Venezuela the fifth, followed by Colombia.(16)

One problem according to this ranking is that it does not account for the fact that much of Brazil’s equipment is near obsolete, while Colombia has been receiving the latest military hardware from the U.S. government as part of Plan Colombia.

Analysts continue to debate on how to measure military power in Latin America, but all agree that if a “strategic imbalance” exists in the hemisphere, it continues to favor the United States. SouthCom’s communications officers did not respond to requests concerning its operating budget, but documents available on the Internet put it around US$ 170 million for 2008.(17)

This amount does not include military aid. Oddly enough, since the end of the Cold War when U.S. economic aid was more than the amount of military aid, now the two are growing closer. In 2005, Congress appropriated US$ 921.07 million in economic aid and at least US$ 859.69 million in military aid.(18)

The Pentagon continues to lead U.S. foreign policy in the region. For all of the Pentagon’s talk of partnership with South American countries, the U.S. Navy’s presence felt more ominous than amicable when its warships docked in Rio de Janeiro last April. The only ones celebrating were the city’s brothel owners, who registered a marked increase in business.

End Notes

Matthew Flynn, a doctoral student in sociology at the University of Texas at Austin, is conducting field research on Brazil’s pharmaceutical policies. His most recent publication is “Between Subimperialism and Globalization: A Case Study in the Internationalization of Brazilian Capital,” in Latin American Perspectives. He is an analyst for the Americas Policy Program at www.americaspolicy.org.

A leader in naval technology, Rio-based Emgepron (Empresa Gerencial de Projetos Navais), a state-owned company linked to Brazil's Ministry of Defense, is displaying its products at the Doha International Maritime Defense Exhibition Conference (Dimdex 2008).

Antonio Loure, a company official said: "As part of our latest business strategy, we realize the importance of winning the Middle East maritime market with a range of high quality naval equipment".

He said developments in the Middle East and heavy maritime traffic mean regional navies have a tough task at hand and they need to prepare well to keep their territorial waters stable.

Maritime traffic in the region is perhaps amongst the highest in the world and calls for introduction of modern naval equipment, he said.

Brazil, said Loure, has inherited a naval tradition from the former colonial power, Portugal, and now has one of the best navies in South America. The warships that Emgepron builds are amongst the best in the world and equipped with the most advanced naval solutions, said Loure.

"We are already delivering effective and highly qualified naval products to a number of countries," said the Emgepron official.

No one can afford to compromise on issues like defense and security. Together these factors contribute to stability, which in turn provide prosperity said Loure. The Middle East has enormous oil and gas resources and Brazilian companies like ours are ready to share our expertise and experience with navies here.

"Our experience in building modern submarines and frigates assures know-how and high quality levels," he said.

Emgepron makes submarines, frigates, corvettes, patrol boats and other support vessels, explained Loure.

"The Tupi class submarine that we manufacture dives to 300 meters (984 feet) and can achieve a speed of up to 21 knots," he said. The company has also developed a missile decoy system.

He said the firm's repair and maintenance facilities spread across South America could provide effective solutions to regional naval requirements.

Mercopress

"Brazil has well established, peaceful relations with all South American nations … one of our political priorities is economic and structural integration of the region … (and in 2008) we'll also be strengthening our military links," Brazilian Defense Minister, Nelson Jobim, said in a public speech.

Brazil, he added, cannot "neglect its defense. Therefore, we will increase our budget outlays and investment in the army, navy and air force by more than 50%".

He also said Brazil "is elaborating a national strategy defense plan that will determine each military branch's mission and the equipment it needs for its activities".

Mr Jobin said the military equipment envisioned in the plan includes new fighter jets.

Brazil in 2002 mothballed military programs to buy 12 fighter jets worth around US$ 4 billion and build a nuclear submarine over 10 years for a total cost of US$ 1.3 billion. These programs could be re-launched in 2008.

According to official figures made public this week, Brazil has requested in its 2008 budget proposal to Congress some US$ 5 billion for its military forces, with the possibility of raising it to US$ 5.64 billion. Brazil's 2007 military budget was around US$ 3.5 billion.

Mercopress

A Brazilian military contingent of 280 troops embarked today to join the United Nations (UN) peace force in Haiti. They will replace the ones that are returning from that country after a six-month stint.

Two Air Force planes, a Hercules C-130 and a Boeing KC-130, left the Galeão Air Base in Rio de Janeiro to transport the group, which includes 205 members of the Army and 75 from the Navy.

“The force is one of peace, and we are going to carry out a difficult mission. The idea is always to work via negotiations, but, if the use of force is necessary, the personnel are prepared, although this is not the main objective,” explained the commander of the first echelon of the 3rd Contingent of the Brazilian Peace Force, Coronel Adilson Mangiavacchi.

He recalled that Brazil has not suffered any casualties since the start of the mission.

The peace force is expected to remain in Haiti at least until December. Brazil has 1,200 troops engaged in the UN mission: 974 from the Army, 225 from the Navy, and 1 from the Air Force.

ABr

A group of 30 Army and Navy officers embarked May 25 to Port-au-Prince, capital of Haiti. They are part of the 3rd Contingent of the Brazilian Peace Force and will integrate, for six months, the United Nations stabilization mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).

“We will have a very active participation supporting the process, which will take place from October to December, in Haiti, during presidential and parliamentary elections,” said the Head of Social Communication of the 3rd Contingent, lieutenant colonel Jorge Antônio Smicelato.

The military will also participate on reconstruction projects in Haiti managed by the United Nations, such as road infrastructure construction and maintenance, and restoration of schools and hospitals.

According to the lieutenant colonel, this is the first time that Brazilian personnel are going to perform this type of work in that country.

The Army has bought appropriate equipment worth US$ 8.6 million. This expense will be reimbursed by the United Nations.

On June 1st, 145 officers of the Engineering Company will also leave Brazil to work on reconstruction projects in Haiti. By June 13th, a total of 1,200 Brazilian military officers will have been sent to that country.

Agência Brasil