“It’s very simple. If he taxes Brazilian products, there will be reciprocity in Brazil when it comes to taxing products imported from the U.S.,” he said, noting that he expects “Trump to respect Brazil.”

“I’m not worried if he’s going to fight over Greenland, the Gulf of Mexico, or Panama. What he needs to do is respect the sovereignty of other countries,” said the Brazilian leader, who reiterated his desire to strengthen cooperation with the U.S., Brazil’s number two trade partner after China.

“For my part, I want to improve that relationship,” Lula said, emphasizing that his country is interested in exporting and importing more if necessary.

Recently, Trump called Brazil a “tremendous tariff creator” and accused it of trying to harm the U.S. economy. “We will impose tariffs on countries that really want to harm us. They want to harm us, even though they basically want to do good for their country. Look at what others are doing: China is a tremendous tariff creator, India, Brazil, and so many other countries,” the U.S. President said.

China, India, and Brazil are three of the countries that make up the BRICS forum of emerging economies, along with Russia, South Africa, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Iran, and Indonesia.

Lula hopes to meet with the Republican leader at the next G7 summit if invited, or during the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

Deportees

Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the creation of a working group with the US Embassy in Brasília to exchange information on deported Brazilians and the operation of deportation flights. According to the ministry, the measure aims to guarantee “the safety and dignified and respectful treatment of passengers.”

The plan is to immediately establish a direct line of communication between the members of the group and allow for real-time monitoring of upcoming flights.

The proposal to create a working group had been discussed at a meeting between Lula and his ministers at the Planalto presidential palace, when the Brazilian government announced that it would set up a humanitarian reception post at Confins International Airport, in Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais state, to receive Brazilians deported from the USA. The location was chosen because it is the terminal to which flights chartered by the US government have been destined over the last few years.

Brazil’s mobilization comes days after a deportation flight carrying 88 Brazilians suffered a series of problems, with passengers being handcuffed the entire time, reports of aggression on the part of US agents, deprivation of food and access to toilets, as well as technical problems that impaired the functioning of the air conditioning and forced the aircraft to make unscheduled stopovers.

The Secretary for Brazilian Communities Abroad and Consular and Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Márcia Loureiro, met with the chargé d’affaires of the US Embassy in Brazil, Gabriel Escobar, to discuss the deportation of Brazilians. Summoning the American authority in this case is a diplomatic gesture that expresses one country’s discontent with another.

Around the same time, the US had also deported dozens of Brazilian migrants. These people arrived in the Amazonian city of Manaus handcuffed, with the Brazilian government expressing outrage over their “degrading treatment”. One of the migrants claimed they were not given any water during the six-hour flight nor were they allowed to use the bathroom.

Petro’s pushback enraged Trump. In a post on his Truth Social media site, Trump wrote: “We will not allow the Colombian government to violate its legal obligations with regard to the acceptance and return of the criminals they forced into the US”. He then threatened Colombia with 25% tariffs and said his government would impose a travel ban on Colombian government officials.

Petro responded by launching a scathing social media attack on Trump. He initially vowed retaliatory tariffs on US goods and also insisted he would not accept migrants who were not treated with “dignity and respect”. But, within a few hours, Petro had backed down.

According to a White House statement released late that evening, Colombia had agreed to all of Trump’s terms. This included the “unrestricted acceptance of all illegal aliens from Colombia returned from the US, including on US military aircraft, without limitation or delay”.

The White House hailed the agreement with Colombia as a victory for Trump’s hardline immigration strategy. In her statement, press secretary Karoline Leavitt wrote: “Today’s events make clear to the world that America is respected again.” But Trump’s punishing tariff threats and foul rhetoric toward illegal immigrants may only damage the power and position of the US in the region.

Setting a bad precedent

As Petro’s row with Trump unfolded, Colombia’s former president Iván Duque accused his successor of engaging in “an act of tremendous irresponsibility”. He stressed that Colombia has a “moral duty” to take back the illegal migrants sent by the US, and highlighted the “enormous” toll sanctions and tariffs would have on the economy.

However, in an interconnected international economic system, Trump’s unilateral threat of tariffs and sanctions can be a double-edged sword.

Colombia is a relatively minor trading partner to the US. But if Petro’s government had refused to comply with Trump’s demands, it still would have meant higher prices for coffee, avocado and several other commodities. In 2022, the US imported US$ 24.8 billion (£20 billion) worth of goods from Colombia – nearly US$2 billion of which was coffee.

Trump’s willingness to wage a trade war with countries in Latin America may also encourage other economies in the region to speed up their search for alternative trade partners. This could lead to more trade deals between Latin American nations themselves.

In May 2023, under the leadership of Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, 12 South American nations gathered in Brazil’s capital, Brasília, to express their interest in reviving the Union of South American Nations with the explicit aim of bolstering regional trade and cooperation.

The union effectively broke down in 2019 after major nations like Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Peru withdrew their membership amid concerns about Venezuela’s leadership. But the “Latin America is stronger together” slogan often quoted by political leaders in the region may now actually materialize, thanks to Trump.

Latin American nations are looking further afield, too. The EU established a trade deal with Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia in December 2024, bringing 25 years of on-off negotiations to a close. Trump’s tariff threats could encourage other economies in the region to explore becoming a part of that agreement, potentially at the expense of the US.

And it’s possible that more Latin American countries may eventually seek membership of the Brics bloc of emerging economies, which has repeatedly drawn Trump’s ire for eating into US power and influence. Bolivia and Cuba, alongside seven other countries, were announced as partner states to Brics in late 2024, and more could follow. While not officially part of the bloc, these partner states will get support from its members.

Worse still, Trump’s threats could inadvertently push Latin American nations into the arms of China. During Trump’s first term, his administration coined the term “troika of tyranny” to describe Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela. These countries are all led by dictators.

Since then, Beijing has actively pursued a policy of closer cooperation with these countries by making them “strategic competitors” against the US in the region. A 2024 report by researchers at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, an American think tank, even found evidence of suspected Chinese spy facilities in Cuba.

Trump’s uncharitable rhetoric and less-than-civilized treatment of illegal immigrants are, at the very least, likely to fuel more anti-American sentiment in the region. This resentment towards the US may well manifest in building bridges with governments and ideologies that are inimical to US interests.

Amalendu Misra is a professor of International Politics at Lancaster University.

This article was originally published in The Conversation. Read the original article here: https://theconversation.com/trumps-method-for-repatriating-migrants-risks-undermining-us-interests-in-latin-america-248396

In a new working paper we provide new evidence tracing the rise of populism in Brazil – through both the victory of presidents Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 2002 and Jair Bolsonaro in 2018 – to regional economic shocks caused by a process of trade liberalization that began in the early 1990s.

Both Lula and Bolsonaro were able to mobilize voters by amplifying divisions caused by trade shocks and subsequent periods of austerity. But the two leaders were elected on very different platforms and narratives.

Economic Shocks

In 1990, the government of Fernando Collor de Mello started to implement a large program of trade liberalization in an attempt to modernize the economy. Between 1990 and 1995, import tariffs were reduced from an average of 30.5% to 12.8%.

This reduction was uneven across regions and sectors. For instance, while the level of tariff changes in the agriculture and mining sectors were relatively small, in sectors such as clothing and rubber, import tariffs reduced by more than 30%. This meant that local industries faced larger increases in competition from cheaper imports with adverse consequences for some local economies.

The impact of these new tariffs varied across Brazil’s microregions – groups of economically integrated municipalities – depending on the concentration of different sectors in each area. Microregions that experienced the largest tariff cuts became more vulnerable to international competition, affecting the labour market and the structure of Brazil’s economy.

This shock led to long-lasting declines in formal employment and in wages relative to other regions. Some of Brazil’s largest cities, including Belo Horizonte, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro were highly affected by the tariff changes.

As our analysis shows, these effects persisted for decades and affected the political preferences of Brazilians. We found those microregions across Brazil that experienced the largest tariff cuts in the early 1990s were more likely to vote both for Lula in 2002 and for Bolsonaro in 2018. These microregions also recorded significant numbers of swing voters from Lula to Bolsonaro.

The effects of the trade reforms were further amplified by periods of austerity that hit Brazil just before the two elections. Both Lula and Bolsonaro exploited the effects of austerity and previous effects of the trade shocks by building political agendas that appealed to those voters who had lost out either economically or socially from the interaction between these economic shocks.

From Leftwing to Rightwing Populism

But while these economic factors are directly linked to the rise of populism, they don’t explain its different varieties. Lula’s leftwing platform was very different from Bolsonaro’s far-right agenda.

This dramatic shift in Brazilians’ preference for leftwing populism in 2002 and for rightwing populism in 2018 is explained by the different political strategies Lula and Bolsonaro used to capture large enough constituencies.

On the left, Lula took advantage of the austerity policies of his predecessors in the early 2000s, which lead to dramatic rises in inequality, to amplify economic cleavages in society. Lula’s variety of populism resulted in one of the largest social protection programs in the world and large reductions in poverty and inequality.

But these achievements were marred by accusations of corruption and economic mismanagement, for which Lula was convicted and imprisoned between 2018 and 2019.

On the right, Bolsonaro took advantage of the austerity policies implemented between 2015 and 2018 by the government of Dilma Rousseff, Lula’s successor. Bolsonaro also played on voters’ feelings of insecurity by promoting a strongman image, strengthening social and cultural divisions and anti-migration sentiment.

His variety of populism has resulted in the reversal of decades of economic development and climate adaptation and one of the world’s largest death rates related to COVID-19.

Across the world, the shortcomings of populist agendas in Mexico, the US, UK and India, among others, have been laid bare by failures to contain the spread of infections and death rates from the virus. Yet, the success of populist politicians lies on appealing to existing economic and social divisions.

Given Brazil’s experience, there are now fears that the entrenchment of populism could reverse decades of development and threaten democracy itself across many other parts of the world.

Patricia Justino is a professor and senior research fellow at the World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), United Nations University.

Bruno Martorano is an assistant professor at the Maastricht University and Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (UNU-MERIT), United Nations University.

This article was originally published in The Conversation. Read the original article here: https://theconversation.com/populism-in-brazil-how-liberalisation-and-austerity-led-to-the-rise-of-lula-and-bolsonaro-146780

The No Taxes on Drugs and Devices Initiative (NtDDi), an international coalition of scholars and health experts that calls for eradication of surcharges on life-saving drugs and devices yesterday applauded Brazil for reducing import taxes by 11% on approximately 1,000 essential drugs. 

The organization added, however,  that Brazil must now drop taxes and tariffs on all life-saving medicines and medical devices to improve access for the country’s 186 million citizens.

“While Brazil’s announcement on reducing taxes on medicines is encouraging, this is just the start of what needs to be done,” said Roger Bate, co-director of NtDDi. 

“We urge Brazil with an average tax and tariff of 29% to drop these highly regressive barriers on access to medicines.”

A recent study by NtDDi has uncovered widespread taxes on medicines in the developing world – Brazil still maintains a 9% tariff, Nigeria a 20% tariff, and India a 16% tariff.

NtDDi members call on the eradication of surcharges, duties, tariffs and other taxes on life-saving medicines and medical devices. 

NtDDi estimates that a 1% overall decrease in taxes and tariffs is associated with a 1% increase in access to essential medicines worldwide. 

“We urge Brazil to adopt the principles of NtDDi in the name of those suffering,” said Richard Tren of Africa Fighting Malaria and NtDDi co-director.  “Brazil has a moral obligation to drop all taxes and tariffs.”

No Taxes on Drugs and Devices Initiative aims to improve access to life-saving medicines and medical devices for people living in developing nations around the world afflicted by HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, ,malaria and other pandemic diseases. 

NtDDi is composed of a variety of like minded organizations and scholars including: economists, health experts and trade officials who will collaborate in their efforts to eradicate unnecessary and burdensome barriers to treatment for the world’s poor.

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