In its recent report, the UN and the International Panel of Climate Change estimates that global food production is responsible for 21-37% of “anthropogenic emissions”. What lies behind this Anthropogen that treats humankind in general as responsible for the climate change emergency? The destruction of the Amazon is in fact the consequence of a geopolitical conflict, connecting Brazil to China, China to the US – and Brazil, as a member of the Mercosur, to the EU.

When it comes to the climate change crisis, the humble soybean has a lot to answer for. Not the bean itself, of course, but the human production and consumption related to it, and more particularly the national politics surrounding it.

When President Trump declared trade war on China, one of the direct impacts was a Chinese response placing 25% tariffs on soy imports from the USA. At the same time, after the election of President Bolsonaro in Brazil, previous legal limitations on deforestation of the Amazon and expansion into the Cerrado, in significant part for soy production, were relaxed.

As the deceptively named Environment Minister, Ricardo Salles, said in a recent interview for the Financial Times (23.08.2019), laws were too restrictive, and commercial development must instead “monetize” the Amazon. Turn fires into dollars.

The result is a perfect climate-change storm. Brazil had already overtaken the USA as the main exporter of soy in the second decade of the twenty first century. This trade war has stimulated a great leap forward in exports to China, already by far the largest importer of soy from Brazil – over 85% of Brazil’s exports by 2018.

Two climate-change denying Presidents, plus growing demand for soy as animal feed for China’s growing meat consumption, plus deforestation and land conversion in Brazil. Result? An explosive climate change acceleration event.

While this event is significant in its own right, it also challenges how we need to think about the nature of the climate change crisis. Two highly influential recent publications in Nature and The Lancet identifying the greatest risks of transgressing planetary boundaries for the sustainability of human (and non-human) life affirmed strikingly that “food production is the largest cause of global environmental change”.

It accounts for up to 37% of total global greenhouse gases, two and a half times more that total global transport. The urgency of addressing land use and food production and consumption has just been highlighted by the UN’s International Panel on Climate Change report, Climate Change and Land. It appeared only days before the news of the burning Amazon hit the headlines.

Moreover, world population is set to rise from nearly 7 billion to 9 billion. At least as significant, there are dramatic shifts in the food people consume, particularly transitions to greater meat consumption.

So, food perhaps presents the biggest but also the most intractable threat of the climate change crisis. In all the National Plans for climate change mitigation and underpinning the 2016 Paris Agreement, food production and consumption was marginalized, or even in many cases omitted. This potato was politically too hot to handle in many national contexts.

So, is this a crisis brought about by the human species in aggregate: The Anthropogen of the IPCC? Or, as many on the left have also argued, is this crisis a product of global capitalism, a general economic engine of limitless expansion and appropriation of nature: The Capitalogen of climate change crisis? Present profit before future planet.

The Trump-Bolsonaro, Brazil-USA-China, climate change crisis event illustrates why we need better social science than either of these globalist accounts, and certainly why we need to pay more attention to national politics in any analysis.

Food production and consumption are especially useful for forcing us to think directly of how different societies are endowed with different environmental resources, as an almost taken for granted, but nonetheless formative background for economic development, and for the national politics of that development.

Societies, and different political economies, differ enormously in how they generate greenhouse gases, how they consume energy, food, water, and how they trade internationally, with different climate change impacts. They also face different political challenges in confronting the climate change emergency. Not every country has the Amazon in its back garden.

Before I started my research into food production and consumption in China, I had not fully appreciated the scarcity of its agricultural land, in spite of its extensive national territory. It has less quality agricultural land per capita than even the UK, and a fraction of that of the USA or Brazil.

Its water resources for food production are even scarcer, a quarter of the world average. Within this environmental context, and following a long history of famines, the politics of food production was dominated by the twin imperative of food security and food self-sufficiency.

Following the death of Mao Tse Tung and the market socialist reforms of Deng Xiaoping, agricultural intensification was combined with a major fragmentation of land ownership under the Household Responsibility System. Egalitarian distribution of leasehold land to 250 million peasant farmers, market incentives, and huge increase in the use of chemical fertilizers aimed to satisfy the twin imperative.

As a consequence, from being a net importer of nitrogen phosphate fertilizer to a net exporter, China now uses more than 30% of the world total, more than the whole of Northern Europe and the USA put together. With peasants given subsidies to use fertilizers, the amount of fertilizer per hectare is many times that of Europe.

Both Chinese experts and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization recognize the result: an ecological catastrophe. Overuse of nitrogen fertilizer is a major source of nitrogen oxide, a powerful greenhouse gas. So, apart from acidification of the soil and eutrophication of surface water, rice production in particular contributes significantly to China’s greenhouse gas emissions.

And now, as agricultural productivity itself was threatened, China recognizes the problem, and has come up with its distinctive political solutions, a limitation of the use of nitrogen phosphates to a 1% increase until 2020, and a cap on total use thereafter.

This brief account exemplifies the need for the concept of sociogenesis of climate change. A distinctive political economy, operating within its specific land and water resource environment, generates a climate change crisis and then its own characteristic mitigation policies.

This is not a dynamic of a socially amorphous Anthropogen or a globalist Capitalogen in interaction with Nature in general. This is a distinctively Chinese dynamic, in its own environmental context.

Then, at the turn of the century, China recognized that limits of its own land-water resources were such that it could no longer equate food security with food self-sufficiency. Especially to meet the demand for increasing meat consumption, pork in particular, for a population previously unable to afford it, China decisively shifted to importing soy beans from Brazil to feed its expanding pig production.

Enter Brazil. Although Europe had led the way in using soy protein to replace animal protein after the BSE crisis, China followed on to become its biggest market. Brazil’s climate change crisis is almost the opposite to China’s.

From the time of the military dictatorship (1964-1975) there has been a politically driven process of expanding agricultural production through extensification, converting uncultivated land into agricultural land, in an inexorable progression from timber extraction, to cattle and soy production.

This led to the earlier “arc of fire”. Brazil is now the largest exporter of beef, poultry, coffee, orange juice, and, overtaking the USA, soy. Where China’s agricultural land was shrinking, Brazil’s was increasing by 5 million hectares every year since the 1990s, particularly into the Legal Amazon.

In Brazil, big multinational capital, much of it Brazilian, is certainly involved, dominating agricultural production. The top 1% of farms with over 1000 hectares occupy over 45% of cultivated land.

The Roncador Group has a farm of 150,000 hectares, the Amaggi Group Tanguro farm, 80,000 hectares. JBS is the top global meat producer and exporter in the world, and the total Brazilian beef herd now exceeds 200 million.

It is calculated that the methane production of this herd from enteric fermentation exceeds the CO2 emissions from Brazilian land clearance and deforestation.

This is the distinctive Brazilian climate change crisis, not a generic Capitalogen, but a politically fostered national economy in interaction with a unique resource environment. And, until the arrival of Bolsonaro, a distinctive set of policies was put in place to limit land extensification: the registration of land-ownership, pioneering satellite tracking of land incursions, moratoriums on soy and beef production on any newly converted land.

These mitigation policies succeeded in radically reducing, but far from eliminating Amazonian deforestation, and significant ecologies, notably the Cerrado in Mato Grosso, were much less protected.

One more sociogenic contrast. In both China and Brazil, with increasing per capita income, there has been a transition to eating more meat. China now outstrips the USA for pork consumption, and in overall meat consumption had reached an annual per capita quantity of 52.4 kilos in 2011.

Brazil has overtaken the European average, with 92.6 kilos, with beef the premier meat with its much higher GHG impact. None approach Trump beef steak America, with an average of 135 kilos for all meats.

At the opposite extreme, India with its Hindu nationalist vegetarianism, persecuting Muslim beef eaters, has the lowest per capita meat consumption, with a less pronounced transition to more people eating more meat. Cultures of consumption – not individual consumer choices – have major climate change consequences.

Out of sociogenic contrasts come sociogenic connections. Global food trade is not from anywhere to anywhere. Trade flows are highly structured, and in the case of China and Brazil, opposites attract. China’s lack of land and water resources creates the demand for Brazil’s abundance.

China’s politics of trade condition this trade: it imports only whole soybeans, for its own animal feed industry to process. A deal between Brazil and China to trade in national currencies escapes the dominant dollar as reserve currency for international trade. This is a specific nation-to-nation connection between production and consumption. From Brexit, as we know only too well, trade connections are politically made and un-made.

One of the major limitations of the UN brokered Paris Agreement with its national plans for climate change mitigation is that it only treats nations as GHG producers. Trade, and the connection between producers and consumers, is a sustainability black hole.

As has now become only too clear from President Macron’s finger-pointing at Bolsonaro, the trade agreement between the EU and the Mercosur failed to enshrine legal commitments on conserving the Amazon or the Cerrado. The soy connection between China and Brazil shows that nation-to-nation trade is a critical dynamic of the sociogenic climate change emergency.

This takes us back to the beginning. Trump and Bolsonaro have just pressed the accelerator on that dynamic. Economies are political, and the politics of economies are driving the climate change emergency. Combating climate change involves contesting those politics within our different societal and environmental contexts.

One more reason to be European in a European Union context, engaging in the politics of our shared environmental resources and for legally enforceable sustainable international trade. Or go down the route of environmental catastrophe with the Trump-Bolsonaro politics of planetary destruction.

Mark Harvey is Emeritus Professor at the Center for Research in Economic Sociology and Innovation at the University of Essex. He is also Honorary Professor, Department of Sociology, Sustainable Consumption Institute, University of Manchester.

His latest book is Inequality and Democratic Egalitarianism. Marx’s economy and beyond and other essays published by Manchester University Press.

This article appeared originally in Open Democracy – https://www.opendemocracy.net/

Sino dos Alpes is based in the city of Bom Retiro do Sul, in the southernmost Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul, where it manufactures pork and chicken meat products, such as meat sausage, ham, spiced ham, pâté, sliced meats and mortadella.

The company was established in 1999 through a partnership between GSI and the Languiru cooperative, from Rio Grande do Sul. Each owned half of the business. In 2002, the Italian group bought the cooperative out and took over 100% of operations.

Perdigão and GSI also signed a memorandum of understanding aimed at exchanging technology for development and manufacturing of meat-based foods in Italy and Brazil, and reciprocal commercialization of products.

Sino dos Alpes has a built area of 14,000 square meters (150,000 square feet) and employs 191 people. Currently, the factory is operating with idle capacity. Since Perdigão is also a producer of raw material, it should optimize the processing capacity of the unit, which at first will be completely occupied, and then enlarged at a later phase.

Grandi Salumifici Italiani has 150-year experience in production of cold meats. In addition to Italy, where it operates 11 units, the group owns a factory in Austria and six factories in China. It also has commercial representations in Germany, France, Belgium, Croatia, Greece and Scandinavia. In 2005, the company’s revenue was US$ 626.1 million.

The purchase will increase the operations of Perdigão in Rio Grande do Sul. The company already has important exporting units in the state, in the cities of Maraú and Serafina Corrêa, in addition to animal food factories, in Gaurama and Maraú, and grain purchase branches, in Maraú, Serafina Corrêa, and Casca.

Last year, Perdigão invested approximately US$ 12.9 million in its units in Rio Grande do Sul, where it employs more than 7,800 people and has partnerships with 1,652 integrated poultry and pork producers. In the field of transports, through contracts with 111 companies, Perdigão generates another 300 indirect jobs.

One of Latin America’s foremost food companies, Perdigão ranks among the main employers in Brazil, with approximately 40,000 employees. This year, the company should have US$ 2.9 billion in profit. Late last year, the company announced an expected 10% increase in meat sales for 2007.

Anba

In terms of volume, pork exports are up 25%, reaching 580,956 tons. The information is from the pork trade association (Associação Brasileira das Indústrias Produtoras e Exportadoras de Carnes Suí­nas) (Abipecs).

Pedro de Camargo Neto, the Abipecs president, reports that in November there was a drop in exports of pork because of a strike by Brazilian customs officials.

Thus, whereas in October over 65,000 tons were exported, in November that fell to 42,000 tons, and revenue dropped from US$ 122 million to US$ 77 million.

Even so, it has been a very good year for the sector, says Camargo Neto. For the twelve-month period ending in August, for the first time ever, the sector had exports worth US$ 1 billion.

And there was a 25.3% rise in pork prices on international markets, bringing the price per ton to US$ 1,872.

Abr

This information was given by the Brazilian Industrial Association of Pork Producers and Exporters (ABIPECS), Thursday, November 10. Year-to-date, 539,174 tons of pork were exported, which is 27.4% more than the January-October period of 2004.

After registering a reduction in September, exports went back up in October, when revenue totaled US$ 121.8 million, the year’s highest, and 55% more than in October of 2004. October shipments went up 45%, when compared to October of last year.

Pork exports during the last 12 consecutive months totaled US$ 1.172 billion, when 629,266 tons of the product were shipped abroad.

Brazil is the largest pork exporter in the world. Russia is the country’s largest buyer. This year, Russia bought approximately 40% of all of the meat Brazil exported, that is, 348,695 tons that cost US$ 696.54 million.

According to ABIPECS, the recent occurrences of foot-and-mouth disease (FAM), in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, did not affect country’s pork exports.

ABr

The shipments added up to 56,400 tons, 16% more than in the same month last year, according to information released today by the Brazilian Pork Exporters Association (Abipecs).

From January to September this year, external sales of the product already add up to US$ 888.3 million, which means an increase in 64% in relation to the first nine months last year.

Pork meat shipments added up to 473,600 tons, 25.3% more than in the same period in 2004.

To Russia, main market for Brazilian pork, 301,900 tons were exported between January and September, which means 64% of the total shipped in this period.

The president of the Brazilian Industrial Association of Pork Producers and Exporters (Abipecs), Pedro Camargo, informed of his fear that Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), which is still being negotiated, will imply a shift in Russian preference to other markets, especially the European Union, to the detriment of Brazilian pork exports.

Russia is the biggest buyer of Brazilian pork. Between January and August of this year, the Russians purchased 266,656 tons, 64% of Brazil’s overall pork exports during this period, according to data released Wednesday, September 14, by the Abipecs.

Over the past twelve months, a total of 599,426 tons, worth US$ 1.1 billion, have been shipped there. The volume would have been even greater, had the Russian government not imposed an embargo during the period.

In a note to the press, the Abipecs says that “it hopes that the Ministry of Foreign Relations will remain firm, to the point of rejecting Russia’s entry into the multilateral body, unless the parties reach an agreement that will not be harmful to Brazilian exports.”

Agência Brasil

Brazilian pork exports grew for the third straight month. 60,873 tons were exported in July, generating revenues of US$ 166.339 million. Export volumes in May and June were 52,308 and 57,452 tons, respectively.

According to the Brazilian Industrial Association of Pork Producers and Exporters (Abipecs), foreign exchange earnings in July were 82.5% greater than in July, 2004, and shipments were up 40%.

The Abipecs reported that the median price was US$ 1,911 per ton, 30.6% higher than in July, 2004.

From January to July of this year, exports totaled US$ 669.350, and 352,735 tons were shipped, representing increases of 80.39% and 30.7%, respectively, when compared with the first seven months of last year, the Abipecs informed.

The principal market continues to be Russia, which imported 223,634 tons, 39% more than during the January-July period in 2004.

Earnings came to US$ 451.311 million (up 99.36%). The most important buyers after Russia were Hong Kong, Argentina, Singapure, and South Africa.

Agência Brasil

Brazil’s exports of pork rose sharply in the first half of 2005, to US$ 553 million, an increase of 80% over the same period last year.

For the last twelve months, pork export revenue has been slightly over US$ 1 billion.

Russia is the biggest importer of Brazilian pork. Its imports for the first half, totalling 178,000 tons, were up 32%, compared to the same period in 2004.

However, with international prices high, pork export revenue totalled US$ 360 million, an increase of 91%.

Other big importers of Brazilian pork are Hong Kong, Argentina, Singapore and South Africa.

ABr

Revenues from Brazilian pork exports rose 81.11% between January and May of this year, compared with the first five months of 2004.

In the first five months of the year, revenues totalled US$ 444 million. The volume shipped, in turn, totalled 234,000 tons, against 183,000 tons from January to May 2004.

These data were released, yesterday (8), in São Paulo, by the Brazilian Industrial Association of Pork Producers and Exporters (Abipecs).

The data for May showed that pork exports declined in volume, but earnings were up, generating US$ 101.3 million, 45.89% more than in May of last year. A total of 52,000 tons of the product were shipped, against 49,000 in May 2004

The chief markets for Brazilian pork were Russia, Hong Kong, and Argentina, which together imported 73.85% of the total sold abroad.

The market for Brazilian pork that grew the most in the first five months of 2005 was Gabon, a country located in western Africa. Earnings were up 5,708.40%.

The second biggest increase was in sales to the Ivory Coast, another African country, where revenues rose 4,949.42%.

Other rapidly expanding markets were Kazakhstan, Portugal, and Turkey, in each of which sales rose more than 1,500% in volume and over 3,000% in terms of value.

Russia is the largest market for Brazilian pork. The country imported a total of 138,060 tons in the first five months of the year representing an increase of 25% over the same period last year.

Brazilian exports to Russia totalled US$ 279.2 million, a growth of 85.8%.

ABr/Anba

Brazilian exports of pork meat added up to US$ 115.8 million in April, which represented an increase in 106.5% in relation to the same month last year.

The volume exported was of 60,000 tons of the product, a historic record, according to information released today by the Brazilian Pork Exporters Association (Associação Brasileira da Indústria Produtora e Exportadora de Carne Suí­na, Abipecs).

From January to April this year, external sales have already yielded US$ 342.7 million, an increase in 95% in relation to the first four months last year.

The shipments added up to 182,000 tons, 36.5% more than in the same period in 2004.

The greatest market for Brazilian pork meat is Russia, which imported 101,700 tons in the first four months of the year. Following Russia is Hong-Kong, Argentina, Singapore and South Africa.

Anba