Since the end of the military government, Brazilian presidents have mostly leaned towards the center-left or have been ideologically ill-defined. Tancredo Neves won election in 1985 from the center-left. After his untimely death he was replaced by his vice president, José Sarney, who was conservative but largely deferred to the Constituent Assembly in the writing of a new constitution.  Fernando Collor de Melo was elected in 1989 with a right-populist campaign, without much support from established parties. But Collor’s signature policy, his anti-inflation plan, wasn’t conservative, it invoked strong state controls of prices. It quickly flopped and he was impeached for corruption. His Vice President, Itamar Franco, had no clear ideological position.

Then for almost a quarter century from 1994 to 2018 Brazilian presidential politics was largely polarized between the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), led by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), led by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The two leaders were more popular than their parties, and they shared many political ideals. Fernando Henrique considers himself to be on the center-left, although some call him center-right. Lula ran from the left in his first three failed presidential campaigns, but he then shifted to a much more moderate center-left position to win the presidency. In his first presidential term, Lula continued Fernando Henrique’s economic model, much to the frustration of his leftist critics.

  Lula moved more to the left in his second term, as did his anointed successor Dilma Rousseff. This worked as long as Brazil was riding high on a commodities boom, but failed when the economy crashed. Dilma took the blame and ended up impeached, leaving the office to the centrist and very unpopular Michael Temer.

Why didn’t conservative forces assert themselves more effectively during the years since the return to democracy? One hypothesis might be that Brazilian public opinion leans to the left so they didn’t have enough popular support. Another might be that Brazilians don’t think in terms of “right” and “left” or don’t believe the terms apply to Brazil. Neither of these hypotheses is correct according to a recent paper by political scientist André Singer analyzing survey data from Datafolha. He found that  the Brazilian ideological spectrum was largely consistent for the entire period from 1990 to 2019.

    Self-classification on the Ideological Spectrum in Brazil from 1990-2019 (in %)

Source: André Singer, A reativação da direita no Brasil, data from Datafolha; SciELO Preprints -11-2021, https://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/preprint/view/1664/version/1767 

Several very interesting things are shown in this table. First, most Brazilians think they understand the terms “left” and “right” well enough to classify themselves on a scale from right to left. Second, more Brazilians classify themselves as “right” than “left” and this has been true for all of the years since 1990. Third, the percent choosing “don’t know” was higher during the Lula and Dilma presidencies. Finally, the percentage classifying themselves as “center” has increased in recent years at the expense of the “don’t know” category.

In his analysis, Singer argues that Lula “deactivated” ideological thinking to win the presidency. He didn’t get people to become leftists, he got them to stop thinking ideologically, at least when he was running. This was clearly his intention as expressed in his “Letter to the Brazilian People” promising to honor Brazil’s debts and maintain economic stability, the major conservative priorities at the time. Similarly, although Fernando Henrique was known as a scholar interested in Marxist theories, he won the presidency by stabilizing the currency, a hoary conservative goal. Fernando Henrique had strong support from conservatives and business leaders for opposing the leftist platform Lula and the PT advocated at the time.

National politics during the Fernando Henrique, Lula and Dilma presidencies was largely a struggle between two parties that actually overlap quite a bit ideologically. Lula and Fernando Henrique had been allies in fighting the military regime and they contested much of the same ideological terrain after that. What happened to the more conservative politicians? The PSDB and the PT successfully bought them off by making electoral coalitions and giving them payoffs. A great many Brazilian politicians identified with the “center” such as the small parties known as the centrão and those in the Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB). But they didn’t have a defined centrist ideology, many just wanted to hedge their bets, keeping the flexibility to win payoffs from whichever party controlled the presidency. The MDB, although a very powerful party in many states and in the legislature, was often content to not run a presidential candidate at all, preferring to wait to cut the best deal with whomever won.

In 1918, Bolsonaro filled the gap left by the weakness of the conservative leaders in large part by giving voice to generalized disgust with the corruption and greed of the Brazilian political class. This is a Brazilian tradition, past presidents who appealed to this sentiment were Jânio Quadros, whose symbol was the broom he would use to sweep the country clean, and Fernando Collor de Melo, who promised to free the country of government officials he said lived like Indian maharajahs. Neither was successful. 

After the economic collapse of 2013, the mensalão and lava jato scandals, and the arrest of Lula, many voters thought it was time to shake the system up. That worked for Bolsonaro in 2018, but it won’t work so well in 2022, because he has been the system. To win in 2022, Bolsonaro has to appeal to conservative sentiments. If Brazilians are asked to choose between “right” and “left,” André Singer’s analysis shows that the right will have an advantage.

A lot will depend on the increasing percentage of voters who categorize themselves as “center” and who may go for whichever candidate seems less extreme. A more competent leader with centrist inclinations might do well, such as João Doria who has done a much better job of running the state of São Paulo than Bolsonaro has of running the country. But any such leader will have a hard time beating Lula or Bolsonaro in the first electoral round. Unless the courts or health problems intervene, the second round seems likely to be between Lula and Bolsonaro.

Fernando Henrique Cardoso has said that, while he will support the PSDB candidate in the first round of the election, he will vote for Lula should he be Bolsonaro’s opponent in the runoff. Lula, for his part, understands he has to appeal to centrist and moderate voters to win, and has welcomed Fernando Henrique’s support. Lula and Fernando Henrique were allies against the military regime in the 1960s, perhaps they and their parties can form a de facto alliance against the neo-militarist Bolsonaro regime.

To win, the moderate left will have to appeal to centrist voters by emphasizing personality and administrative competence. Today, the ideological divide is largely focused on social issues – gay rights, abortion, crime, gun control and so on. Brazilian public opinion leans conservative on these issues. Economic issues are less salient today because the alternatives are poorly defined, except for the very poor who want to protect bolsa família. The Venezuelan example is a burden for the left, and it isn’t clear what better economic alternative the Brazilian left offers. Bolsonaro’s greatest vulnerabilities are his mishandling of the Covid pandemic and his ineffectiveness in rooting out corruption and running the country. 

It seems to me that Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula da Silva working together would probably mean more to Brazilian public opinion than any alliance between parties.

Ted Goertzel is Emeritus Professor of Sociology at Rutgers University in Camden NJ

Fachin’s ruling upheld the Prosecutor-General’s Office (PGR) argument that the three former presidents no longer have special jurisdiction privileges, which means they can now be prosecuted in the ordinary lower and appeals court system rather than the Supreme Court.

Emílio Odebrecht, one of the owners of Odebrecht building corporation, said the company donated under the table to former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s presidential campaigns in 1993 and 1997. Cardoso will now be prosecuted in a federal court in São Paulo.

The accusations against former president Lula were remanded to a federal court in Paraná. Odebrecht whistleblowers mentioned alleged dealings with Lula to use his political influence to secure an interim presidential decree designed to avoid engaging the Prosecution Service in leniency deals struck by businesses in the Car Wash probe.

The whistleblowers went on to mention requests for Lula to pull the strings to secure contracts with the government of Angola for Odebrecht; the renovation, by Odebrecht, of a country house in Atibaia, São Paulo state, which allegedly belonged to Lula, and the hiring by Odebrecht of Lula Institute’s lectures in exchange for political favors.

Former president Dilma Rousseff was accused of receiving illegal donations for her election campaign. The allegations will be handled by a federal court in São Paulo.

The probe on former president, now Senator Fernando Collor de Mello will be handled by the Supreme Court because of Collor’s special jurisdiction privileges as a member of Congress. He is accused of receiving unreported donations from Odebrecht for his campaign to the Senate in 2010.

Cardoso declined to comment until he has access to the contents of the ruling. Lula’s counsel dismissed the whistleblowers’ allegations, maintaining he did not break any laws.

Rousseff’s campaign counsel said all donations received were reported to, and approved by, the Electoral Court. Collor’s lawyers declined to comment.

Odebrecht

Edson Fachin, the leading Justice in the Lava Jato case (Petrobras corruption), agreed to the investigations after accepting 83 different documents, presented by the Federal Prosecution Office based on plea bargain testimonies of 78 officials or former officials from Latin America’s largest construction group Odebrecht, which has admitted to a massive bribes network in Brazil and the region.

The list of names under investigation released by Justice Edson Fachin read like a Who’s Who of Brazilian politics, tarnishing past statesmen and potential presidential candidates alike.

The investigations refer to elected officials who under Brazilian law can only be judged by the Supreme Court. Ex presidents Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff are not included in the so called Fachin List since they no longer hold elected posts and are not entitled to the special status.

Likewise current president Michel Temer has been excluded from the List since he enjoys “temporary immunity”, according to Justice Fachin, one of the eleven members which make up the Brazilian Federal Tribunal or Supreme Court. While in office the president can’t be charged for crimes not committed during his mandate.

The nine ministers in the List are: Eliseu Padilha and Wellington Moreira Franco, cabinet chief and deputy chief; Science and Technology Secretary Gilberto Kassab; Helder Barbalho, National Integration; Foreign minister Aloysio Nunes; Agriculture minister Blairo Maggi; Cities minister Bruno Araújo; Culture minister Roberto Freire and Marcos Pereira, Industry and Foreign trade minister.

The three state governors are Robinson Faria from Rio Grande de Norte; Tião Viana, Acre and Renan Vasconcelos Calheiros Filho, Alagoas.

The speakers of the Senate, Eunicio Oliveira and from the Lower House Rodrigo Maia are also in the Fachin List. Among the well known senators are Aécio Neves, president of PSDB, Temer’s main ally and the second most voted presidential candidate in 2014, and Romero Jucá, president of PMDB, the incumbent party.

The plea bargain system which has enabled to open the web of corruption in the political system, government suppliers and other companies obtained crucial information from Marcelo Odebrecht, heir of the construction group; Benedicto Junior, ex Head of Infrastructure; Alexandrino Alencar, head of Institutional Relations; Claudio Melo Filho, ex Institutional Relations; Jose Carvalho Filho, ex Institutional Relations.

The most frequent crimes allegedly committed are passive and active corruption; money laundering; fraudulent bids; forming cartels and public documents forging.

Apparently Attorney General Rodrigo Janot sent the Supreme Court last 14 March a total of 320 investigation requests, of which it declined competence on 211 since they did not involve elected or government officials, but were sent to ordinary courts.

When the news broke out, São Paulo residents banged pots and pans in protest against political corruption, while in the capital Brasília deputies left a session in the lower house earlier in the day as news of the list began to break.

The investigation into nine ministers, or nearly a third of the president’s cabinet, poses a serious threat to Temer’s efforts to pass deep austerity reforms that he says are needed to regain investor confidence and lift the economy out of its worst recession on record.

“More than having nine ministers on the list, the biggest problem for the government is seeing its whole political nucleus there,” said Danilo Gennari, partner with Brasília-based consultancy Distrito Relações Governamentais, referring to the implication of key government allies.

Among that core is Temer’s chief of staff Eliseu Padilha, an experienced politician considered key in negotiations with Congress to pass the administration’s crucial pension and other reforms. Likewise ministers in crucial areas such as foreign affairs, trade and agriculture.

“The political crisis will deepen and we risk an institutional paralysis because the entire Brazilian political system is under question,” opposition senator Jorge Viana, who is under investigation himself, said in a statement.

However aides close to Temer have said that it could take months for ministers to be charged, meaning Padilha and other key cabinet members likely will stay in their posts long enough to ensure the passage of reforms.

ABr/MP

Collor explained that he was concerned about what he called the “unfriendly” attitude of the government of Ecuador with regard to Brazil. He said there had been a change in the relationship.

In fact, there was a spike in unfriendliness in 2008 when president Rafael Correa of Ecuador called for international arbitration with respect to a $597 million debt with the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES). At that time, Brazil recalled its ambassador.

Before that, Correa ordered the expulsion of the Brazilian construction company, Norberto Odebrecht, claiming that there were serious problems with a dam, the San Francisco, the company was building. Four company executives had their constitutional rights suspended by the government of Ecuador.

Cultural Agreement

Brazil and Paraguay, the two countries that jointly operate the world’s second biggest hydroelectric power plant, the Itaipu Binacional, have announced the signing of a new cultural agreement that will extend to 2013.

According to Brazil’s minister of Culture, Jucá Ferreira, it is a game changer worth 44 million reais (US$ 24.5 million). “This is a significant contribution to our partnership. It will mean an incremental expansion of our efforts to reduce regional disparities within Mercosur.”

He added that the Brazilian government has become more aware of the need to go beyond commercial and geopolitical relations in order to strengthen the economic block Mercosur, which consists of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, plus Venezuela.

Among the agreement priorities is a renovation project for the historical center of Asuncion, the capital of Paraguay.

But the main focus of the agreement, as with so much of Brazil-Paraguay relations, will be the area surrounding the Itaipu dam.

“This is Guarani territory that is shared by both countries. It will be benefited by a program that promotes citizenship,” said minister Jucá Ferreira, adding that Itaipu Binacional is a company that is interested in matters beyond electricity – ecology and cultural services are also part of the corporate mix, he said.

ABr